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Increasing water scarcity due to droughts and competition for water resources is threat-
ening the ability of cities all over the world, even those that are well-resourced, to provide
their residents with basic water services. My three-paper dissertation addresses three different
areas of intervention aimed at addressing water scarcity.
In my first paper, I address incentives to create technologies that address water scarcity.
Concerns of a “deficit” of water-related technologies question the widely held belief that we can
innovate our way out of water crises. In the context of the United States, I exploit temporal
and spatial variation in the incidence of drought and the implementation of water technology
clusters to explain changes in water-related patenting activity. I find that patenting activity
does not increase following droughts, which suggests few incentives to innovate exist. I do
find that water technology clusters boost water-related innovation, suggesting that additional
policy interventions may be warranted.
In my second paper, I provide insights into price-based rationing for managing residential
water demand, an increasingly popular demand management tool. The efficacy and distri-
butional impacts of this approach depends on households’ heterogeneous price sensitivity. I
estimate heterogenous price responses for single family households in Chapel Hill, NC using
a household-level panel dataset that features a large change in marginal water prices and a
iii
novel measure of local hydrological stress. Contrary to prior research, I find households with
presumably strong preferences for irrigation are no less price sensitive than other households.
In my third paper, I examine water utility compliance with state-imposed mandates
for water conservation during severe droughts. States use mandates as a policy intended to
address conflicting incentives for conservation by water utilities. Using data on urban water
utilities in California subjected to a year-long mandate, I provide evidence that mandating
higher conservation objectives does not lead to water utilities increasing water conservation.
Moreover, I show that compliance is higher for water utilities where customers actively
complain about “water waste.” In this context, private citizen activism appears to be an
overlooked aspect of local agency compliance.
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PREFACE
“We will never miss the water till the stream gets dry. It is not like human nature
to prize highly that which costs us nothing, but the taking.”
-S.J. Rosamund, 1905
In 1994/95, I experienced firsthand one of Morocco worst droughts on record. In Tangier,
my hometown, reservoir levels fell to about 10% of overall capacity; levels so low that desperate
measures had to be taken. Four tankers (bateaux-citernes) were chartered to barge in from
Jorf Lasfar, a port city 461km (286mi) away. For seven months, city planners rationed water,
limiting running water to only three days a week for four hours on each of those days. At
home and at school, water dominated all aspects of everyday life. I can still recall helping
to fill up empty bottles at every possible opportunity so that my family could wash, cook,
drink, and clean. Even then, I realized that this event made an indelible mark on my way of
thinking and living. Water insecurity is all too real and traumatic. To this day, my family still
keeps an emergency supply of water stockpiled for fear of future water cutoffs or shortages
despite improvements in water management and infrastructure.
These memories came flooding back in 2014, a year in which California—a state that
I have strong personal connections to—was experiencing severe drought conditions which
continued to worsen, leading to California’s first-ever statewide mandate for water conservation
in 2015. Concurrently, the ALS ice-bucket challenge had people dumping buckets of ice-water
on themselves, many of whom were living in drought-stricken California. This struck me
as a glaring oddity. Water is one of our most precious resources, yet it is continually taken
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for granted. In developed countries, people expect water to come out of their faucets 24/7
without giving a second thought to where the water comes from, where it goes, and with little
knowledge of the costs associated with its provision. More importantly, it seems as if people
are willing to use water with an almost callous disregard even when faced with the realization
that it is a scarce resource. Not long afterwards, there was intense concern over the effect that
a drought was having on the largely agriculture-based economy back in Morocco. Though
2014 had been an abundantly wet year, I remember the calls for national prayers for rain
and predictions that 2016 would be as dry as 1994/95 during one of my visits to Morocco in
2015. By late 2016, Tétouan—a city only 63km (39mi) away from Tangier—had to resort to
rationing water.
Though droughts are an increasingly important reason why water resources are scarce,
they are not the only cause for concern. Notably, cities all over the world are growing thirstier
due to rapid urbanization and economic development. As a result, cities are constantly
seeking out new water supplies and often competing over water resources to keep up with
demand. Traditional strategies that focus purely on managing water supplies are therefore
not enough. It is increasingly important to explore options that manage the demand for
water and delay the need for expensive capacity expansions, rather than increasing capacity
to meet demand.
At a professional inflection point, I decided to pursue a PhD in City and Regional
Planning with a focus on water resource management to help work towards solutions from an
interdisciplinary perspective. The role of planners is especially complex because the challenges
facing water management are multifaceted and interconnected. In addition to ensuring supply
in the face of population growth and environmental threats resulting from climate change,
water management involves addressing challenges on social, economic, technological, and
institutional fronts. Planners in the water sector, at both the local and state levels, need be
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aware of how to manage water resource and minimize conflict in the context of increasing
urban growth and climate change.
The foresight that I had about going into this field was borne out a few months
before I defended my dissertation proposal in March 2018. On January 19th, 2018, the
Western Cape Water Supply District—the water utility serving the city of Cape Town, South
Africa—announced that it was coming dangerously close to running out of water due to
drought. Experts predicted that the city would run out of municipal water (referred to in
the media as “Day Zero”) in a matter of months. Cape Town’s near brush with what is
arguably every water utility manager’s worst nightmare serves a powerful reminder that
increasing water scarcity is threatening the ability of cities all over the world, even those that
are well-resourced, to provide their residents with basic water services.
I structure my dissertation as a series of three papers on distinct policies related to water
demand management. My aim is highlight successes and failures in current approaches to
provide guidance in the years to come.
In my first paper, I focus on the role of technological innovation in addressing water
scarcity because while there is a belief that we can innovate our way out of water crises,
there is also a longstanding concern that there is a “deficit of innovation” in the water sector
that questions whether technology can deliver “solutions commensurate to the impending
stresses on urban water systems” (Kiparsky et al 2013). Some countries have attempted to
address this by establishing initiatives to promote water-related innovation by identifying
and supporting local efforts with increased funding and other assistance. In the U.S., for
example, Environmental Protection Agency to establish a Water Technology Innovation
Clusters Initiative in 2011. A similar initiative was launched by Scottish Water in 2018
(the Water Test Network) to increase market opportunities in North-West Europe. In the
academic literature on innovation, however, there is a marked absence of studies on the
drivers of water-related technologies (Wehn and Montalvo, 2018). This is problematic because
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if we are to innovate our way out of water scarcity, we must first understand what drives—or
does not drive—the creation of new water technologies. An often-cited concern is that water
resources are underpriced because prices are not set through the market but through highly
political processes. In the absence of market prices, an important question is whether existing
institutional mechanisms signal scarcity, a necessary step for encouraging innovation.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I shed light on the extent to
which water scarcity prompts innovative activity, using droughts as observable and exogenous
events that generate water scarcity. I empirically test this by examining patenting activity
following droughts. Second, I assess the effectiveness of a public policy intervention, the
establishment of a Water Technology Innovation Clusters Initiative, as a potential solution
to increase water-related technological innovation. Overall, I find evidence that patenting
activity does not change following the incidence of droughts, suggesting that water-scarcity
alone does not induce more innovation. This finding supports the notion that there is a
lack of innovation in the water sector. I also find evidence to suggest that water technology
clusters increase overall patenting activity. Together, these findings suggest that additional
policy interventions may be warranted to support innovation in the water sector.
In my second paper, I collaborate with economists, engineers, and hydrologists to study
the use of prices to manage demand for residential water. In recent years, price-based
approaches have gained popularity among water utilities as a tool to manage demand,
especially among residential users. Little is known, however, regarding its effectiveness in
managing demand for households that are most likely to maintain lawns. In part, this is
because implementing price increases can be challenging. Notably, increasing prices can hurt
financially vulnerable households and potentially conflict with the social principle of “the
human right to water.” This challenge has meant that large price changes have been relatively
rare. It is also the case, however, that data maintenance can be poor. For instance, it is
common for water utilities to lose data when upgrading to a new billing software. If prices
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are to be used effectively as a demand management tool, water utilities need to analyze their
data to understand the effect of pricing policies.
This study contributes to the rich literature on water demand in two ways. First, I
define households in terms of past usage and wealth simultaneously instead of in isolation
to underscore the fact that both dimensions are necessary for understanding household
responses, but neither is sufficient by itself. For example, households with similar wealth
levels may have different preferences for outdoor water usage, or households with comparable
levels of past usage may respond to changes in price differently given the resources at their
disposal. Second, I estimate price responses for single family residential households under
price variation that is much larger than typically observed in studies of the water sector. I use
a highly detailed panel of households’ monthly water usage in Chapel Hill and Carborro, NC
from 1999-2005 with a change in pricing policy that generated price changes of about 40%.
To my knowledge, no other study has conducted a household-level longitudinal analysis for
water under the same magnitude of price variation. Contrary to previous studies, I find that
households that are most likely to irrigate are no less price-sensitive than other households. If
anything, the point estimates suggest that heavy-usage households are more price elastic than
households that are less likely to irrigate. These results provide an optimistic assessment of
the utilities’ ability to use prices to reduce water consumption by households with high-usage.
In my final dissertation paper, I focus on the role of state governments in managing
drought. During drought, local water utilities may face conflicting incentives to conserve
water. On the one hand, water utilities want to ensure continuity of service and avoid
supplies falling below minimum reserve levels. On the other hand, water utilities face several
disincentives for engaging in conservation due to local situational factors. Water utilities,
for instance, may shy away from increasing prices or implementing usage restrictions due to
social and political pressures exerted by their customers (Mullin, 2009; Teodoro, Zhang and
Switzer, 2018). To address conflicting incentives for conservation at the local level, states often
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rely on mandates that require water utilities to conserve. Mandates promote conservation
through two mechanisms: (1) increasing political acceptance of local conservation efforts by
shifting some of the responsibility from local water utilities to the state agency, and (2) the
threat of fines and potential legal action against the water utility for noncompliance. To
pursue conservation, water utilities implement one or more strategies to manage demand,
including public awareness campaigns, rebates for turf replacement or water efficient fixtures,
mandatory watering restrictions (caps on usage), and pricing strategies. Conservation is
therefore ultimately a result of reductions made by water utility customers. The two-part
nature of the problem presents a challenge for states because they often do not observe water
utilities actions, or if they do, may not easily interpret them as water utilities implementing
the same strategy may do so with varying degrees of “implementational intensity” (Halich
and Stephenson, 2009).
I contribute to the literature by accounting for the two-part nature of the problem using
a double-principal-agent framework as a heuristic device. I consider local situational factors
to account for differences at the customer level that may affect water utilities’ ability to
conserve. Notably, I account for the degree to which customers actively complain about
“water waste.” During droughts, water utilities often encourage customers to anonymously
report instances where other customers are using water in ways that are deemed “wasteful”
as a passive enforcement mechanism. Using evidence from California during the 2015-2016
drought, I do not find evidence that mandating objectives leads to intended results. I do show,
however, that both conservation and compliance is higher in service areas where customers
actively complain about “water waste” than in service areas where customers do not. In
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PAPER 1: IS DROUGHT “IN THE AIR"? EFFECT OF DROUGHTS ON
WATER-RELATED PATENTING ACTIVITY
1.1 Introduction
Technological innovation has played a pivotal role in addressing resource scarcities by
relaxing binding resource constraints for resources such as food, copper, iron, nickel, silver,
tin, coal, and natural gas through the development of new processes that enable the use of
substitutes, improve efficiency, or enable access to untapped resources (e.g. Krautkraemer,
2005). In this context, longstanding concerns of a “deficit of innovation" in the water
sector have led scientists and policymakers to question whether technology can deliver
“solutions commensurate to the impending stresses on urban water systems" (Kiparsky et al.,
2013).1 Given the substantial welfare consequences associated with water shortages,2 these
concerns prompted the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to spearhead the Water
Technology Cluster Initiative in 2011 to identify and support local efforts with funding and
other types of assistance.3
1Stressors include increased demand (Averyt et al., 2013), uncertain precipitation patterns (Milly
et al., 2008), aging infrastructure (Kalogo, Monteith and Eng, 2008), and contamination of water
supplies (Addams et al., 2009).
2Water scarcity negatively impacts energy production (Gleick, 1994; Spang et al., 2014), food
security (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007), and public health (Haines et al., 2006).
3Similar initiatives have since been launched in other parts of the world (e.g. Water Test Network
in Europe).
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In this paper, I analyze the extent to which water scarcity prompts innovative activity by
treating droughts as observable and exogenous events that generate water scarcity and patent
data as an observable measure that proxies for innovative activity and R&D expenditure.
In addition, I assess the impact of the Water Technology Innovation Clusters Initiative as a
public policy solution aimed at increasing water-related technological innovation. I construct
a panel data set that allows me to describe changes in regional water-related patenting activity
using variation in the timing and geographic location in both the incidence of droughts and
establishment of water technology clusters. Overall, I find evidence that patenting activity
does not change following the incidence of droughts, suggesting that water-scarcity alone
does not induce more innovation. This finding supports the notion that there is a lack of
innovation in the water sector.4 I also find that the support provided by the EPA initiative
significantly increased water-related patenting activity. Together, these findings suggest that
additional policy interventions may be warranted to support innovation in the water sector.
Innovating our way out of water scarcity requires inventing (and deploying) appropriate
technologies quickly enough to address continuously emerging needs.5 Specifically, arguments
that “necessity is the mother of invention" hinge on our ability to recognize scarcity quickly
enough to act. Notably, the economic argument rests on the assumption that scarcity drives
prices upwards. These increased prices then signal to innovators that they can make a profit
by inventing new processes that enable the use of substitutes, improve efficiency, or enable
access to untapped resources (e.g. Shumpeter, 1934). Prices in the water sector, however, are
not set through the market but instead through highly political processes. As a result, water
4The “water sector" is used broadly to describe actors who participate and are dependent on water
for day-to-day operations such as utilities, end-users, firms, and others.
5Adoption of water-related technologies is a significant barrier to innovation. Adoption of technologies
is beyond the scope of this particular study.
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resources are often under-priced (e.g. Renzetti, 1999; Elnaboulsi, 1999; Timmins, 2002). The
inability to price water using market-based principles is often cited as a reason for the lack of
water-related innovative activity. In the absence of market prices, the question is whether
other institutional mechanisms encourage innovation.
Some scholars have posited that the threat of scarcity itself may be sufficient to spark
human ingenuity (e.g. Boserup, 1981; Simon and Bartlett, 1985). In support of this argument,
previous droughts over the past few decades garnered significant media attention and triggered
significant policy changes (Wiener, Pulwarty and Ware, 2016). For example, several droughts
(1976-77, 1988, 1998, 2000-2004, 2011-12) have led to requirements to create water shortage
response plans, long-range water plans, land-use integration policies, and other frameworks to
better manage water supplies. Droughts have also spurred interest in water markets6 and crop
insurance.7 With respect to technological innovation, previous studies have documented high
financing gaps (Krozer et al., 2010) and low rates of water-related patenting activity (Ajami,
Thompson and Victor, 2014). Little is known, however, on the dynamics of innovation in the
water sector.8
I contribute to body of work on environmental innovation by shedding light on the
inventive phase (i.e. the timing of inventions) of water-related technologies. This paper also
6The first major economic investigation of water marketing and the property right to water occurred
in the context of policy debate over a state and federal involvement in a California water project in
the middle of a drought (Hirshleifer, De Haven and Milliman, 1969).
7In 2014, for example, the USDA announced additional targeted assistance for areas affected by the
most extreme and exceptional drought, namely in California and Texas (USDA, 2014). The USDA
manages several insurance programs related to drought (USDA, n.d.).
8The absence of academic studies on water innovation led to the publication of a special issue in the
Journal of Cleaner Production (Volume 171, Supplement, 10 January 2018) to serve as a foundation
for future studies on water innovation (Wehn and Montalvo, 2018).
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connects the environmental innovation literature to the growing literature on the economic
effects of natural disasters (Becerra, 2012; Kellenberg and Mobarak, 2011; Miao and Popp,
2014), further contributing to the literature on endogenous technological change by assessing
the impact of droughts as a stimulus for innovation (Miao and Popp, 2014).
My approach contrasts with previous work on environmental innovation by examining
innovative activity through the lens of regions instead of at the firm level (e.g. Hemmelskamp,
1999; Horbach, 2008; Di Stefano, Gambardella and Verona, 2012).9 In doing so, I bridge the
literature on environmental innovation to the body of work on Regional Innovation Systems
(RIS), two literatures that have largely operated independent of each other. I ground my
study in the RIS literature because firms do not innovate in isolation but through interactions
with other and industry-related actors in their regional ecosystem (e.g. universities and
public administrations). These interactions produce regionally specific knowledge that
then generates more innovation (Cooke, 1992, 1998; Feldman and Florida, 1994; Feldman
and Audretsch, 1999; Feldman, 2001; Camagni, 1995; Asheim, 1996; Crevoisier, 2004).10
Moreover, these interactions create dense regional “learning networks" of mutually reinforcing
industries that allow innovators to quickly capitalize on new ideas and innovative solutions to
pressing problems in a process that Alfred Marshall once described as being “in the air." More
importantly, the RIS literature explains the basis for the Water Technology Innovation Cluster
Initiative as an explicit attempt to leverage learning networks to increase and accelerate the
rate of water-related innovation.
9A few studies have examined innovative activity at national levels (e.g. Miao and Popp, 2014).
10See Stuck, Broekel and Revilla Diez (2016) for a review of the RIS literature.
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1.2 Conceptual Framework
In this paper, I investigate whether droughts generate interest in creating technologies
that address water scarcity. Though prices for water resources are not set through market
mechanisms, water scarcity may still promote innovation because individuals, firms, and
other organizations that heavily reliant on water resources for daily activities may seek to
reduce the risk and uncertainty of drought-related disruptions to water supplies.
Moreover, drought-related water scarcity may generate increased competition over water
resources that may in turn generate interest in water-related technologies. Resource-based
theory of organizational behavior, for instance, holds that an organization faced with scarcity
will engage in increased competitive behavior if it can secure access to scarce resources
that can confer it with a competitive advantage (Selznick, 1957; Andrews, 1971; Barney,
1986; Chandler, 1990).11 Similarly, firms may seek a competitive advantage by developing
technologies that increase local water supplies (e.g. process that recycle water resources)
or by developing new processes or technologies that reduce the intensity with which water
resources are used.12 Innovation is therefore an important means of creating and maintaining
a sustainable competitive advantage. Transaction cost economics (TCE) holds environmental
uncertainty will entice firms for vertical integration (e.g. Helfat and Teece, 1987; Williamson,
1988). This theory holds that the process of vertically integration itself may help the acquiring
firm reconfigure resources or integrate resources, increasing innovative activity (Iansiti, 1995).
Alternatively, resource dependence theory (RDT) contends that firms will attempt to reduce
11Organizations, for instance, might adopt a “race to the bottom for extraction-profit" strategy
by developing technologies to access water resources at lower depths (Maldonado and del Pilar
Moreno-Sanchez, 2016).
12Firms may also choose to mitigate against local scarcity by importing water. Transferring water
over long distances, however, can be expensive and not feasible in many situations.
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environmental uncertainty by renegotiating interorganizational relationships to minimize
dependency (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For instance, support
industries often re-purpose their technological know-how to create technologies that can be
applied to other sectors of the economy (Kuramoto and Sagasti, 2006; Lorentzen, 2015).
Assuming that disruptions to water supply caused by droughts is sufficient to generate
interest in creating water technologies, the question that naturally arises is where one would
expect innovation to occur. One the one hand, innovative activity may not necessarily be
confined to a particular geographic location. Innovators, for example, can create a technology
and market it anywhere where there is demand for that technology. Innovators could learn
about droughts occurring in areas far from their own locations through media or other sources.
In the United States, for example, several droughts have received nationwide attention
(Wiener, Pulwarty and Ware, 2016). Depending on where a particular firm decides to locate
its R&D facility, they could be creating solutions to address problems experienced by another
branch experiencing drought.
On the other hand, one would expect innovative activity to be particularly strong in
geographic locations that experience drought. Droughts represent exogenously determined
instances of local scarcity (i.e. unusual departures in average precipitation levels for a
particular climate).13 Power-plants, oil and gas companies, farmers, and others that are
heavily dependent on water for operations may invest in developing new technologies to
address their particular operational concerns. Furthermore, one would expect competition
over water resources to be a a largely localized phenomenon since transporting water over
long distances may cost-prohibitive or illegal in some situations.
13Definitions include a lack of precipitation (meteorological drought), a lack of soil moisture
(agricultural drought), or by reduced streamflow or groundwater levels (hydrologic drought)
(USGS, n.d.).
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The RIS literature contends that innovation is largely a local process that arises due
to both competitive and cooperative interactions between firms and other innovative agents
in local economic environments. This literature describes innovation as these interactions
that lead to innovation in terms of “learning networks," an interactive process determined by
the interdependent choices that innovative agents, users, and other market actors make. For
instance, firms often compete with each other over resources and often draw on the same
labor pool but also cooperate with other each other on projects and obtain advice from
neighboring firms. These “learning networks" are thought to generate and diffuses knowledge
locally. Firms and organizations that are part of these networks are often interdependent
and mutually reliant on each other for resources, often acting as external supply chain
partners. Industries also tend to cluster spatially around universities and other public
research institutions (Feldman, 1994).14
The RIS literature attributes the development of “learning networks" primarily to
spatial proximity (e.g. Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Cooke et al., 2008; Stuck, Broekel and
Revilla Diez, 2016). The importance of spatial proximity can in part be explained by the role
of regional institutions. Firms and industry-related actors in close spatial proximity share a
common institutional framework. In the United States, for instance, legal doctrines for water
management have evolved differently in western states relative to eastern states. Moreover,
14Firms rely significantly on academic research (Arora, Belenzon and Patacconi, 2018) and may also
have a direct influence on the topics that academics work on (Furman and MacGarvie, 2007; Evans,
2010; Sohn, 2014). Universities are a key local industry-related institution as they produce skilled
labor and act as engines that help create, diffuse, and deploy new knowledge in economically useful
ways (Feldman et al., 2002). A key mechanism through which universities diffuse and deploy
knowledge to the private sector is through licensing patents to spin-off businesses or industrial
partners (university-to-industry transfers).
7
state governments have significant autonomy over environmental regulation.15 For instance,
water-related technologies must get approved by each state in which it is marketed and sold.
In some states, regulation may be highly localized, enacted at a municipal level rather than
a state level. Institutions–both formal and informal–are important for shaping incentives
for technical innovation and provide the basis for the type of social interactions between
organizations. The sharing of a common institutional framework can be also be related
to sharing common social and cultural understanding necessary to build trust (Lundvall,
1992). The spatial proximity to universities and other public research institutions have been
associated with positive effects on R&D expenditure (Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2011).
The importance of spatial proximity for innovation can also be explained by the reductions
in transaction costs associated with exchanging and communicating knowledge and information
locally. This gives rise to locally specific tacit knowledge that is facilitated through face-to-face
contact with individuals or organizations in close spatial proximity. There is substantial
evidence that the importance of local relationships are important for innovation even in
the context of modern information and communication technologies (e.g. internet) (e.g.
Kaufmann, Lehner and Tödtling, 2003). Though internet-based communication technologies
lower transaction costs of co-operating with potential innovation partners around the world,
they are not perfect substitute for face-to-face interaction. Notably, innovation requires
interactions between innovators with different sets of specialized knowledge (Grant, 1996)
and the development of a shared language and overlapping knowledge structures that cannot
be easily accomplished using internet-based communication technologies (Kaufmann, Lehner
15On the one hand, the Porter-Linder hypothesis states that environmental regulation can drive
innovative activity (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). Recent regulations, for instance, motivated
by water scarcity is pushing the power generation industry away from once-through cooling systems
towards closed systems (White, Shelton and Dennis, 2014). On the other hand, the pollution
haven hypothesis states that firms may avoid regions with strict regulations as these regulations
may represent an added cost to doing business (Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004).
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and Tödtling, 2003). Moreover, physical proximity can facilitate “serendipitous encounters"
that in turn lead to creative opportunities (Campa, 2008; Brinks et al., 2018).
The emphasis on local knowledge is especially relevant for the water sector as water
availability is largely determined by local physical and social processes. Differences in institu-
tions, culture, and conceptualizations of what solutions may be socially acceptable play an
important role in how water is managed (Cosgrove and Loucks, 2015). Solutions are therefore
contingent on local factors and would depend on local knowledge for appropriate design of
technologies and products to address local challenges (Andersen, Marìn and Simensen, 2018).
To motivate this anecdotally, many Israeli innovators–leaders in water-related technologies–
have moved to California to work on solutions to address the issue of water scarcity locally
instead (Peleg, 2018). Firms may locate in proximity to suppliers and customers to better
market their technologies to downstream customers (e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
1999) or to facilitate testing and prototype work (Howell and Higgins, 1990).
Instead of studying innovation at an individual firm-level, I draw on the RIS literature
and study innovative activity through the lens of regions. I model each region’s capacity for
innovation, i, at time t, as:
Cit =f(Ii, Fit,Wit) (1.1)
where I represents the presence of key institutional actors (e.g. universities), F represents
overall economic activity in the regional economy, and W represents the presence of water
resources. In this paper, I use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) as the geographically
relevant spatial unit to capture regions.16
16MSAs represent localized and economically coherent areas based on commuting and employment
information therefore would be large enough to capture “learning networks."
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I draw on the natural hazards literature to model the effect of drought. Previous studies
have found that experience with natural disasters shape the perceived risk associated with
the disaster. In order for a drought to elicit a response, however, organizations must first
notice and recognize the incidence of a drought as a significant event that affects their
respective objectives (Cowan, 1986). This information is processed at the organization level
and converted to response (Gresov and Drazin, 1997). For instance, the severity level of a
natural disaster can play an important role in shaping responses (Perry and Lindell, 2008).
This suggests that more severe droughts may have a greater impact on innovation than less
severe droughts.
The perceived risk of drought can also be affected by previous experience with the
particular hazard. On the one hand, previous experience with natural disasters may increase
risk perceptions and levels of preparedness, though these increases may often be short-lived
in nature (Perry and Lindell, 1986). On the other hand, previous experience may have a
desensitizing effect.
I model the perceived risk of drought, Rit, is as a function of attributes of contempora-
neous drought and experience with prior droughts, given by (1.2):





where dit represents drought episodes experienced in MSA, i, in year, t, with each drought
episode modeled as a function of its duration, l, and severity level, s. Experience with prior
droughts is given by hit.
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where d−it represents drought conditions in other regions. This model can then be simplified
as the following reduced-form model:
Pit =f(Ii, Fit,Wit, dit, hit, d−it) (1.4)
The lag between dit and innovation, Pit is of particular interest because pressing concerns
over relatively low patenting activity would be allayed if patenting activity increases following
instances of scarcity. Specifically, this finding would lend credence to the argument that
the threat of scarcity is sufficient to spark “human ingenuity,” suggesting that innovators
are attuned to the needs of the water sector and the presence of institutions and economic
infrastructure necessary to support innovative activity.
Patents are generally filed at the end of the applied research phase. If water scarcity does
lead to an increase in patenting activity, one would expect to see an increase approximately
6-8 years following a drought as that is the average duration of the applied research phase for
water technologies (O’Callaghan et al., 2018).17
17Patents are generally filed at the end of the Applied Research Stage when the scientific basis for




I measure droughts using the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PSDI), a measurement
of dryness based on a physical water-balance model, to capture water stress and relative
dryness.18 The index ranges from -10 (extreme dryness) to 10 (extreme wetness). A major
strength of this index is its effectiveness in quantifying long-term drought.19 This accounts
for possibility that it may take several rain cycles to refill reservoirs and aquifers or restore
soil moisture conditions. I follow the United States Drought Monitor in their classification of
drought, shown in Table 1.3.1.20
Table 1.3.1: Drought Classification using Palmer Drought Severity Index
Classification Range Definition
Abnormally dry -1.0 to -1.9 Lingering water deficits
Moderate drought -2.0 to -2.9 Streams, reservoirs, or wells low;
some water shortages developing or imminent;
voluntary water-use restrictions typically
requested
Severe drought -3.0 to -3.9 Water shortages common;
water restrictions generally imposed
Extreme drought -4.0 to -4.9 Widespread water shortages or restrictions
Exceptional drought -5.0 or less Shortages of water creating water emergencies
Notes: Values between -0.9 and 0.9 indicate normal conditions. Values greater than 1 indicate wet
conditions.
18The model uses primarily relies on precipitation and temperature as inputs.
19Other measures include PHDI, SDI.
20The United States Drought Monitor is a collaboration between National Drought Mitigation
Center (NDMC) at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
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A historical time series of the PDSI is collected from the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) from 1930-2018.21 I define drought episodes as two or more
years of uninterrupted drought, where a year of drought is defined as a calendar years with at
least 6 months with PDSI ≤ -2.0 (moderate, severe, extreme, or exceptional drought). Table
1.3.2 summarizes drought characteristics for all MSAs by Census Region. For each drought
episode, I identify the most severe drought year.
1.3.2 Patent Data
Following standard practice in prior work on innovation, I use patent data to proxy for
innovative activity. Patents are the most commonly used proxy used in the literature on
innovation as they represent innovations that are: (i) novel; (ii) nonobvious; and (iii) useful
(Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Horbach, 2008; Johnstone, Haščič
and Popp, 2010; Horbach, Rammer and Rennings, 2012). Patenting activity has been shown
to be a good proxy for general innovative activity since they are strongly correlated with
R&D spending (e.g. Griliches, 1998). Though patents do not cover innovation in financial or
managerial practices, innovation in these areas may positively impact technological innovation
(Benner and Tushman, 2002). More importantly, there are very few examples of inventions
that have had significant economic and social welfare impacts that have not been patented
(Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Griliches, 1990; Gallini, 2002).
Patent data used in this study consists all utility patents filed in the U.S. between 1976
and 2018, compiled from bulk data files made available by USPTO’s Bulk Data Storage
21These data are available at the USGS climate division level. For MSAs that intersect with multiple
climate divisions, PDSI values are weighted averages, using the percentage of the MSA that
intersects with each climate division as weights.
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Table 1.3.2: Drought Characteristics
Census Region of the United States
MIDWEST NORTHEAST SOUTH WEST
Drought Episodes
Duration (years) 1.60 1.89 1.65 1.73
(0.90) (1.24) (1.01) (1.15)
Years Between Episodes 11.18 13.83 8.14 5.21
(7.22) (11.02) (7.61) (5.39)
Total Count (since 1950) 4.83 3.71 7.28 10.71
(1.63) (1.44) (2.08) (3.18)
Years Spent in Drought Since 1950
Any 7.72 7.07 12.04 18.60
(3.11) (1.86) (4.29) (7.14)
Mild 4.35 4.68 7.17 10.21
(2.15) (1.47) (2.62) (4.01)
Severe 3.38 2.39 4.88 8.38
(1.82) (1.31) (2.73) (4.45)
MSAs Experiencing Drought (%)
1950s 0.86 0.54 0.94 0.79
1960s 0.83 1.00 0.60 0.79
1970s 0.57 0 0.28 0.90
1980s 0.67 0.14 0.81 0.92
1990s 0.20 0.71 0.60 0.83
2000s 0.59 0.54 0.92 0.98
2010s 0.54 0.32 0.76 1.00
Number of MSAs 69 28 121 52
Note: 27 MSAs intersect more than one Census region. These MSAs are assigned to the region with
the largest overlap. Where appropriate, Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) are used instead of
MSAs.
System.22 Patents are published with an average publication lag of 18 months after the
actual filing date. This would primarily affect the ability to observe many of the patents filed
during 2018 and would also affect 2017, though to a more limited extent.
22I restrict the data to utility patents to as they protect the way a manufactured article is used and
works (35 U.S.C. 101) as opposed to design patents that protect the way the article looks (35
U.S.C. 171). I exclude patents that are marked as being reissued or reexamined. Information on
all patent applications published as of September 26th 2019 are obtained from XML and PDF
files USPTO’s Bulk Data Storage System.
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Following Hascic and Migotto (2015), water-related patents are identified using sets of
International Patent Classification (IPC) and Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) codes
that are closely associated with specific types of inventions. The main advantage of using these
codes is that they are heavily reliant on the detailed knowledge of patent examiners (Haščič
and Migotto, 2015). Technologies produced in the water sector are produced for a variety
of different end-users, including residential, industrial, and agricultural users. Technologies
range from low-flow devices, aimed at reducing water consumption, and smart meters, devices
to help monitor water usage to water purification and treatment technologies developed
for industrial users and utilities to help meet stricter environmental standards and reduce
costs of compliance. Water reuse and water recycling technologies, for example, help relieve
pressure on traditional sources of water (Bichai, Grindle and Murthy, 2018). Water-related
are therefore further categorized as technologies that promote conservation, technologies that
augment water supply, and technologies that aim to improve water quality (also referred to
as water pollution abatement or treatment technologies).23 All IPC and CPC codes used
to identify water-related patents are presented in Appendix 1.3.24 Between 1975 and 2018,
a total of 4,336,280 patents were filed by inventors in the the United States.25 Of these,
4,215,624 patents were filed by at least one inventor living in an MSA. Of the patents with at
23Droughts affect water quality by increasing the concentration of point source pollution—sewer
outfalls, industrial discharges, and thermoelectric power plant return flows—and non-point source
pollution—stormwater runoff. This makes it harder to filter and decontaminate drinking water.
Furthermore, reduced water flows can lead to saltwater intrusion, further burdening most water
treatment plants, many of which are not equipped to remove salts (Mosley, 2015).
24The categorization a patent is mutually exclusive as the same patent can have multiple IPC or
CPC codes assoicated with different areas of innovation.
25Entire database consists of 8,427,024 patents.
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least one inventor geographically located within an MSA, 121,197 patents are identified as
water-related.26
I measure of innovative activity using the count of patents filed in each year by MSA.
Where appropriate, Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) are used instead, resulting in a
total of 270 geographic regions. I use the location information associated with the patent
inventor(s) listed on the patent application to assign each patent to a MSAs. This location
reflects the inventors’ location at the time the patent was filed. If the patent had two or more
inventors located in the same MSA, the patent count for the MSA is only incremented by one
to avoid counting the same invention more than once for a particular region. If the patent
had two or more inventors located in the different MSAs, the patent count for each MSA
associated with the patent is incremented by one to reflect that each location was involved in
the creation of the invention. The average yearly patent count for each MSA is displayed by
decade in Figure 1.3.1. There has been an increase in water-related patenting since the 1990s.
This trend is observed in MSAs located in the West, Northeast, and the Midwest regions of
the US.
I trim the data to remove outlier MSAs at the bottom of the distribution for patenting
activity. Specifically, I remove MSAs in the lowest percentile of overall innovative activity
(unrelated to water) and MSAs in the top 5% percentile of zero water-related patents to
exclude MSAs that don’t have the necessary economic infrastructure in place to support
innovative activity in the water sector. This removes a total of 29 MSAs from the sample.
26160,298 patents in the entire database were identified as water-related.
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Figure 1.3.1: Water-Related Patenting Activity Over Time
Note: The figure represents average patenting activity for all water-related patenting activity for
each MSA by decade. Black points on the maps represent the locations of the 18 recognized water
technology clusters. Black points included in all time periods to help visualize patenting activity in
locations that establish a water technology cluster across time and space.
1.3.3 Water Technology Clusters
Technology clusters have been an important part of innovation policy since the mid-to-
late 1990s (Porter, 2000; Braunerhjelm and Feldman, 2007; Delgado, Porter and Stern, 2014).
The creation of technology clusters is intended to promote cooperation among the various
stakeholders to leverage regional strengths and bridge the gap between research and ideas
and successful commercialization of new products (Fieldsteel, 2013). Technology clusters
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are therefore largely built around industries with an already established presence and the
presence of key regional stakeholders which include end-users, universities, research centers,
large firms, government and other relevant institutions.
Water utilities are a key stakeholder in the water sector, responsible for the provision of
water services and waste-water treatment. Many water utilities, however, are cash constrained
which may limit their ability to collaborate or innovate. In particular, many innovators in the
water sector aim to improve water utilities’ ability to recover resources from wastewater and
reduce the energy intensity of water utility operations (Daigger, 2009; Naik and Stenstrom,
2014).
A key goal of water technology clusters is to mitigate some of the risk associated with the
development of new technologies. Many of the water technology clusters provide funding and
opportunities to test, validate, and verify new technologies, serving as a credible third-party
vetting system to screen new technologies. The screening of technologies is important for two
reasons. First, water-related technologies are expensive to test and scale. More importantly,
development of water technologies generally require long testing and review periods because
of factors such as requirements that technologies be piloted in each state as a pre-condition
to commercialized nationally (e.g. Forer and Staub, 2013). Adoption of several successful
technologies in the water sector have taken up to 14 years after pilot testing (O’Callaghan
et al., 2018). Private venture capital funding for the development of water-related technologies
is relatively scarce because of want to take on projects with shorter time horizons.
Second, end-users generally view new technologies as risky, preferring proven technologies
despite the potential gains that newer technologies could offer. This risk aversion often
dampens demand for new technologies and reinforces inertia. This is especially the case for
water utilities as they are primarily preoccupied with continuity of service (e.g. Worm, 2018;
Garrone et al., 2018). More generally, this is important as many technologies fail because
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they often do not address actual market needs due to a lack of end-user engagement during
the development process (EPA, 2014).
In 2011, the EPA established aWater Technology Innovation Cluster Initiative (WTICI)
to jump-start innovation in the water sector by supporting the development of local water
technology clusters. In this paper, reference to technology clusters specifically refers to the
technology clusters that are managed as part of the WTICI.27 The EPA’s official recognition
of water technology clusters represents formal and additional support to reduce barriers to
innovation. As part of the initiative, for example, EPA and other federal agencies help ease
regulatory hurdles and provide support for meetings, networking, planning, coordination to
promote the creation of new technologies that address pressing environmental and public health
challenges and encourage sustainable economic development. In 2018, the EPA transferred
coordination of the water technology program to the Water Environment Federation to be
managed as part of the Leaders Innovation Forum for Technology (LIFT) program, whose
goal is to “establish the conditions that promote accelerated development and implementation
of innovative technologies and approaches" in the water sector (Barillo, 2018).
A total of 18 water technology clusters across the United States are recognized by the
WITCI.28 Each of the established clusters’ technology focus vary based on each regions’
particular needs or strengths. These foci range from water scarcity, reuse, agriculture
challenges, aging water infrastructure, and water quality. A list of the 18 existing water-
related technology clusters, along with their relative foci, is provided in Appendix Table 1.4.1
in Appendix 1.4. Several of the water technology clusters existed prior to WTICI. For the
27There is no universally accepted definition of a technology cluster (Arthurs et al., 2009). Existence
of a technology clusters for various industries, including water, is measured in several ways (Wood,
Harten and Gutierrez, 2018).
28The location of each cluster is geocoded then assigned to the MSA in which is located.
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technology clusters that formed prior to WTICI, I use 2011, the start of the initiative, as the
first year.
1.3.4 Additional Data
The main goal of this study is to examine the relationship between scarcity and water-
related technological innovative activity. It is therefore important to control for other drivers
of innovative activity unrelated to scarcity. Additional data is collected at the MSA level to
capture attributes at a regional scale that may affect the level of water-related innovation
and innovative activity, more generally.
1.3.4.1 Toxic Release Inventory.
Water Quality is measured using data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) from
1986-2017, which is maintained by the EPA (EPA, 2019).29 The program requires facilities in
various industries which manufacture, process, or use significant amounts of toxic chemicals,
to report annually on storage, use, and releases of these chemicals, including information on
the medium in which the substance is released (e.g. air, water, landfill). An advantage of
these data is that firms are not fined for the content of their reports. Firms are fined for not
reporting information. This minimizes concern over incentives for misreporting.30
29Congress created the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in 1986 under Section 313 of the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) in response to a deadly chemical release
at a chemical plant in West Virginia in 1985.
30Other potential data sources on water pollution include federal data repositories: Storet Legacy,
Modern Storet, and the National Water Information System (NWIS). Though these sources
contain valuable water quality information, they suffer from several issues. First, they are not
easily accessible by the public. Second, locations of stations are not exogenous. Lastly, the timing
of the readings themselves are highly endogenous.
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The main purpose of the data compiled by TRI is to provide information about industrial
management of potentially dangerous chemicals to inform the public, help communities plan
for potential chemical emergencies, and assist local governments in accessing information on
possible exposures. A count of the number of chemicals released that are known carcinogens
is used to capture the effect of informal regulation on innovative activity. Given that the
program was established in 1987, these measures do not exist prior to 1987. These measures
are set to 0 in years before the program was established to reflect the fact that this type of
informal regulatory pressure was non-existent.
1.3.4.2 Census Data
Decennial censuses from 1970–2010 are used to collect data on education to proxy for the
availability of a skilled workforce, measured as the proportion of the population with a college
degree or higher. Data for years in between collection are linearly interpolated.31 Yearly
population estimates for MSAs are obtained from the Complete Economic and Demographic
Data Source (CEDDS). Using these data, a measure of population growth is constructed to
capture development pressures that may put strain on existing water supply.
1.3.4.3 Municipal Financial Records
The state of the existing water-related infrastructure may affect both firm location as
well as firm investment in water-related technologies. Municipal spending on water-related
infrastructure is measured using data from the 1967-2015 Annual Survey of State and Local
Government Finances. These data include reports for annual capital and total expenditures
for waste-water, solid waste management, and natural resources for each local government.
31Data collected from IPUMS NHGIS (Manson et al., 2017) and Longitudinal Tract Data Base
(Logan, Xu and Stults, 2014)
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These annual estimates are averaged at the MSA level and linearly interpolated for missing
years.
1.4 Estimation
I adopt a “treated-within-the-treated" approach, extending the difference-in-difference
framework to evaluate both the impact of establishing a Water Technology Cluster on water-
related patenting activity in addition to changes in patenting activity following the incidence
of drought. This approach makes use of variation in both the timing and geographic location
in the incidence of droughts and the recognition of water technology clusters to explain
differences in patenting water-related patenting activity.
In this setup, MSAs that experience drought are considered exposed to a “water scarcity
treatment." Following the event study literature, I capture the dynamic effects of a drought
shock in MSA i, using indicator variables. Let di denote a year in which MSA i experiences a
drought shock; t− di therefore represents the number of years elapsed since a drought shock,
i.e. “relative time” (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2017; Schmidheiny and Siegloch, 2019). Indicator
variables for each year following a drought shock can be expressed as ∑∞τ=1 1{t − di = τ},
where τ = 1 represents the first year following a drought shock and τ =∞ is the maximum
lag possible given the data. Pre-trends (i.e. τ ≤ 0) are not included because the incidence of
a drought episode is considered to be as-good-as-randomly assigned.32
Additionally, MSAs in which a water technology cluster is established are considered
to have received a “policy treatment." These MSAs are treated at various times and, once
treated, remain treated thereafter. Specifically, the policy treatment is defined as, Tit ∈ [0, 1],
32Droughts are usually predicted up to a month in advance. In certain rare instances, droughts are
predicted up to a year in advance (Huang et al., 2014).
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where Tit = 0 if MSA i has not established a Water Technology Cluster by year t and Tit = 1
if it has. MSAs that never establish a Water Technology Cluster are included in the analysis
as control locations. An interaction term, ∑∞τ=1 1{t− di = τ}Tit is included to capture the
dynamic effect of a drought shock that occurs in MSAs with an established water technology











θτ1{t− dij = τ}Tit + δXit + ηi + εit (1.5)
where i indexes MSAs, t indexes calendar years, and j indexes drought events. MSA fixed
effects, ηi, are included to capture time-invariant characteristics that vary by MSA. Specifically,
ηi would account for the general propensity to generate water-related patents and capture
factors that account for these differences, such as institutions, regulatory environments, the
presence of water resources, or differences in knowledge stocks that would affect the level
of patenting across MSAs. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation due to potential persistence of drought shocks that would be captured by
εit. I estimate this equation separately for each technology type (All, Conservation, Supply,
Water-Quality) to account for heterogeneous effects across the broad range of activities that
droughts affect.
The coefficient γτ represents patenting activity in years following droughts in MSAs
without a water technology cluster and the coefficient θτ any additional patenting activity
that occurs in MSAs with an established technology cluster. Identifying the the effect of a
drought shock on patenting activity depends on the assumption that an innovator files for a
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patent in the same location that they experience drought, i.e. they do not move locations
between when drought occurred and when patent is filed.33
The vector Xit represents time-varying observed covariates to controls for factors may
affect water-related patenting activity. First, I control for local innovative activity using a
measure of per capita patenting activity unrelated to water as proxy for the general propensity
to patent in each year t and MSA i. Second, I control for regulatory pressure to create new
water-related technologies unrelated to scarcity using a count of the number of chemicals
released that are known carcinogens. Lastly, I control for temporal variations in patenting
incentives for water-specific technologies using the number of successful U.S. applications in
year t in non-MSA areas, including those filed by foreign corporations (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997).
I also include US census region-specific linear time trends to capture long-term patenting
trends due to differences in climate and regional institutions.
The coefficient, β, captures the mean change in patenting activity observed pre- and
post-establishment of a water technology cluster. Causal interpretation of β requires that
the establishment of a water technology cluster be uncorrelated with water-related patenting
activity. A priori, there is reason to be concerned that the location of a technology clusters is
not random because its establishment is a result of local initiatives. The policy treatment,
Tit, may therefore be endogenous as MSAs select into treatment. Simply comparing locations
with that establish a water technology cluster to those that do not is not sufficient because
locations in which a cluster was created may be systematically different than those where one
was not created. More importantly, these differences might due to unobserved characteristics
that would also be systematically correlated with the outcome of interest (i.e. water-related
patenting activity). These unobserved characteristics will be subsumed in εit. As shown
33This is a common assumption made in literature on innovation.
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Figure 1.4.2: Water-Related Patenting Activity in MSAs that do and do not Establish a
Water Technology Cluster
Note: The solid lines represent average patenting activity. The shaded region represents the
associated 95% confidence interval.
in Figure 1.4.2, patenting trends in MSAs that eventually establish a water technology cluster
are significantly different from MSAs that have not established a cluster.
In the main specification, I account for the potential endogeneity of the policy treatment
using a parametric control function approach motivated by Heckman (1978) extensively used
in the literature (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010; Papke and Wooldridge, 2008; Imbens
and Wooldridge, 2009; Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010; Fernández-Val and Vella, 2011;
Wooldridge, 2015; Kawatkar et al., 2018). As a robustness check, I also estimate the effect of
water technology clusters using a Baysian Structural Time-Series approach in Appendix 1.6.
This alternative approach constructs a synthetic control using untreated MSAs. The results
from this alternative approach are consistent with the results presented in this section.
The parametric control function approach approach is implemented in two stages. In
the first stage, a selection equation is specified and estimated using a Probit regression at
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each cross-section, year t, to obtain estimates of time variant unobserved heterogeneity that
explains the selection into treatment. These estimates are then used to construct the Inverse
Mills Ratio, λ̂it. The control function is then included as a regressor in the outcome equation
to purge εit of the factors that led to selection. This approach is inherently an instrumental
variable method. The first stage is specified as follows:
P (Ti = 1|zit) = φ(zitδt + z̄iξt) (1.6)
where zit are instrumental variables and z̄i are time means of these instruments.34 The set
of exclusion restrictions used in the first stage consist of factors related to water-specific
concerns and the RIS literature. These variables are summarized in Table 1.4.3 and discussed
in Appendix 1.2.
In the second stage, the λ̂it is included as an additional explanatory variable to control
for selection bias.35 MSA fixed effects are replaced with time means of the instruments to
purge the idiosyncratic error term of the factors that led to selection in addition to including
the constructed control function as an additional explanatory variable. The resulting error
34Binary instrumental variables are not time-meaned.
35This approach is the basis for Heckman two-step estimator for endogeneity.
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Table 1.4.3: Control Function Exclusion Restrictions
Variable Description Data Source
Time-Invariant Factors
EPA office Distance to the nearest regional EPA office EPA




Previous drought episodes the total number of drought episodes that a
MSA experienced from 1930 through time
t− 1
NOAA
WaterExp Expenditure on operation, maintenance, and
construction of public water supply systems
ASSLGF
SewExp Expenditure on provision, maintenance, and
operation of sanitary and storm sewer sys-
tems and sewage disposal and treatment fa-
cilities
ASSLGF
Notes: EPA- Environmental Protection Agency; SR- Shanghai Ranking; NOAA-National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration; ASSLGF - Annual Survey of State and Local Governments
term in the new outcome equation is theoretically orthogonal to the explanatory variables.36











θτ1{t− dij = τ}Tit + δXit + λ̂it + z̄i + εit
(1.7)
The results of estimating (1.7) are shown graphically in Figure 1.4.3 through Figure
1.4.4 for various subsets of the coefficients of interest. The full numerical results are given
in Appendix Table 2.2.1. Starting with patenting activity following the incidence of drought,
36This was first proposed by (Mundlak, 1978) and (Chamberlain, 1979). In the absence of selection
bias, the transformation produces the same results as a fixed effects approach (Semykina and
Wooldridge, 2010).
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Figure 1.4.3: Patenting Activity after Drought
Note: Coefficients represent the change in patent counts at each lag following the occurrence of a
drought shock.
the results suggest no evidence that water-scarcity shocks induce more innovation. As shown
in Figure 1.4.3, the magnitude of the lagged coefficients, ∑∞τ γτ , are relatively small and
insignificant from zero, especially for supply and pollution abatement technologies.
With respect to the impact of water technology clusters, the results indicate that
establishing a water technology cluster that receives formal recognition by the EPA increases
patenting activity. In Figure 1.4.4, this effect is represented in the 0mi column. The effect is
strongest for water conservation technologies, with an approximate increase of 41 patents
per year. Smaller increases are observed for water supply and water quality technologies,
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Figure 1.4.4: Effect of Water Technology Cluster on Patenting Activity
Note: The 0mi column is the additional patenting activity that occurs in MSAs with an established
technology cluster. Subsequent columns represent the change in patenting activity for MSAs within
the specified radius of a water technology cluster.
with increases in average patent count of approximately 7 and 11 respectively. I also find
evidence of spillover effects for MSAs within a 50mi radius of a treated MSA (i.e. MSA
with a water technology cluster). I find that MSAs further than 50mi do not significantly
increase patenting activity. Moreover, I find evidence that MSAs further between 150-200mi
of a treated MSA may decrease patenting activity. One potential explanation for this is that
innovators that would have filed for patents in these locations filed for them in the treated
MSA instead.
As shown in Figure 1.4.5, results also indicate that droughts do not induce more
innovation MSAs with water technology clusters. The magnitude of the lagged coefficients
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Figure 1.4.5: Patenting Activity after Drought in MSA with Water Technology Cluster
Note: Coefficients represent the change in patent counts at each lag following the occurrence of a
drought shock in MSAs with an established water technology cluster.
for the effect of drought in MSAs with water technology clusters, ∑∞τ θτ , are not significantly
different from zero.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I focus on technological innovation in water sector because of the long-
standing perception that water-related innovative activity is lagging. I study the inventive
phase of water-related innovation to shed light on whether innovators react to water scarcity,
focusing on the timing of the inventions, as opposed to characteristics of the inventions
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themselves. Specifically, I estimate the extent to which water scarcity motivates innovators
to create new water-related technologies, using the incidence of drought as exogenous water
scarcity shocks.
In general, findings indicate that patenting activity does not increase following water
scarcity shocks. This finding is important as droughts are expected to become more severe.37
Several explanations exist for why this may be the case. First, it is possible that the droughts
observed during the sample period were not considered to be serious ‘scarcity signals.’
Second, the uncertainty in the incidences of drought may influence preferences for
investmenting in new technologies. Previous research has shown that people tend to overweigh
the likelihood of the most favorable outcomes and are consequently less likely to invest or
demand technologies (Bernedo and Ferraro, 2017). Similarly, empirical evidence also suggests
that government insurance programs that insure against crop losses due to extreme heat (e.g.
subsidized crop insurance program) may potentially distort inventivies to create or adopt
technologies in the agricultural sector (Annan and Schlenker, 2015).
Third, it is also possible that technologies already in existence are being increasingly
adopted following instances of drought. Taking this perspective, adoption of already existing
technologies may be considered “innovative" as it would be addressing an issue in a way that
is new for that location as water issues intersect strongly with local concerns and solutions
are contingent on local conditions. This study points to the need to better understand the
adoption behavior of water-related technologies in the context of scarcity.
37With few exceptions, most droughts have not lasted that long as the period under study happens
to be one of the wettest periods within the last 500 years (Pederson et al. 2015).
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Lastly, it is also the case that extreme droughts create conditions that may inhibit
innovative activity. For instance, extreme water scarcity can lead to or exacerbate other
natural disasters (e.g. wildfires, floods, sinkholes) or lead to social unrest (Westerling et al.,
2003; Ichoku et al., 2016; Hand, Thompson and Calkin, 2016; Scasta, Weir and Stambaugh,
2016).38 These secondary effects may draw resources away from innovating on water-related
issues.
With respect to water technology clusters, I find that the establishment of water
technology clusters increases local patenting activity as well as activity in nearby locations. I
find no evidence, however, that innovators operating in the context of a water technology
cluster increase innovative activity after experiencing a drought. The most likely reason
for this finding is that there are too few years of post-drought data to be able to detect a
different response. Further research is needed to understand this finding. This finding would
support the notion that there are significant barriers to innovation that technology clusters
address. Though further work is needed to investigate the attributes of water clusters that
specifically enable them to promote innovative activity, this study also points to the need to
evaluate policies that leverage market forces to promote water-related innovation.
38In California, wildfire related-damages in 2018 totaled over $2.5 billion. Land subsidence can
occur as ground dries which can rupture pipelines buried within, causing costly repairs and wasted
water. While the occurrence of wildfires is not solely driven by drought conditions, the number
of wildfire incidents and the extent of their associated damaged have increased in part due to
changing climate (Hand, Thompson and Calkin, 2016).
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PAPER 2: HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES TO PRICE: EVIDENCE
FROM RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSUMERS1
2.1 Introduction
Public or regulated utilities, such as water and electricity providers, often face demand
or supply fluctuations that make it difficult to satisfy all demand with a single year-round
price. Utilities may respond to these challenges with rationing, either through prices or
explicit usage restrictions, or by increasing capacity. In recent years, price-based rationing
has gained popularity as a demand management tool (Cuthbert and Lemoine, 1996; Newsham
and Bowker, 2010; Kenney et al., 2011; Mayer, Hunter and Smith, 2018). Price increases
can be used to reduce quantity demanded to meet (perhaps reduced) supply while allocating
the utility’s product to consumers with the greatest marginal benefit. The benefits of this
approach are likely to increase in the coming decades due to aging infrastructure, changes in
climate and population, and the increasing cost of creating new capacity.2
In this paper, we provide new insights into price-based rationing by exploiting a detailed
panel of households’ monthly water usage. The data allow us to describe how households
of different wealth and water usage patterns respond, potentially differently, to variation
in water prices, environmental conditions, and usage restrictions. Most notably, we find
1Co-authors include Shadi Eskaf, Julien Isnard, Brian McManus, and Andrew J. Yates.
2Most of the electrical grid and over 30% of water utilities already operate at or near maximum
capacity. Experts have estimated that $1 trillion dollars are required to maintain and expand
service to meet demand over next 25 years (Fynn et al., 2007; American Society of Civil Engineers,
2017; American Water Works Association, 2019).
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that heavy-usage households are no less price sensitive than other households, regardless of
household wealth. These findings are in contrast with the previous literature. Explanations
for these differences include our treatment of heterogeneity as well as the richness of our data.
Understanding heterogeneity in demand for residential water is important for evaluating
the impact of using prices to manage demand. Water supply networks are typically designed
based on peak usage, which generally occurs during the summer when up to 50% of all usage
is for lawn and garden irrigation (Swamee and Sharma, 2008; Lucas, Coombes and Sharma,
2010; Dandy, Nguyen and Davies, 1997; Mayer et al., 1999; Balling, Gober and Jones, 2008).
It is therefore important to quantify the relationship between price and consumption of
heavy-usage households who are likely to irrigate. Estimating heterogeneous responses to
price changes is also a necessary precursor for the analysis of distributional effects.
The previous literature on water demand’s price elasticity has explored heterogeneity
along two dimensions, independently of one another. First, studies have explored how price
responses vary with wealth, usually proxied by assessed home value or income. These studies
suggest that wealthier households have less elastic demand for outdoor water usage as well
as for water usage overall (Mansur and Olmstead, 2012; Wichman, Taylor and von Haefen,
2016). Second, studies have explored heterogeneous responses by usage. Wichman, Taylor
and von Haefen (2016), for instance, find that higher-usage households with irrigation systems
are generally less price sensitive.3 Taken together, these previous results suggest that price-
based policies may not be effective in reducing demand by heavy users, and may generate
distributional effects by raising water expenditures by poor households.
3Wichman, Taylor and von Haefen (2016) examine how price responses vary by wealth and usage
characteristics but not the interaction of the two characteristics.
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We depart from previous work in several ways. First, we examine heterogeneous responses
in terms of usage and wealth simultaneously instead of in isolation. This highlights the fact
that both dimensions are necessary for understanding household responses, but neither is
sufficient alone. Households with similar wealth levels may have different preferences for
outdoor water usage and households with comparable levels of usage may respond differently
to price changes given the resources at their disposal.
Second, we characterize households’ usage heterogeneity in terms of temporal patterns
and levels over the course of a year. We use machine learning cluster analysis techniques
to group households according to similarity in their usage. These groupings, which we call
“usage profiles,” can be used to identify households that likely irrigate, making use of available
data without the need for costly interventions (DeOreo et al., 2011) or strong assumptions
to explicitly distinguish between indoor and outdoor usage.4 Furthermore, characterizing
households in terms of usage profiles is intuitively meaningful and of practical relevance.
Third, our data have several advantages over those used in past studies. We observe
a transition from year-round uniform pricing to seasonal pricing in which summer prices
are about 40% above winter prices. To our knowledge, no other study has conducted a
4In water demand studies, it is often difficult to distinguish between outdoor and indoor usage. One
common approach is to assume that a household’s outdoor usage is equal to the difference between
its usage during irrigation season and the “base usage” of winter months (Howe and Linaweaver,
1967; Danielson, 1979; Maidment, Miaou and Crawford, 1985; Miaou, 1990; Mini, Hogue and
Pincetl, 2014). In addition, water demand studies generally have not addressed household-level
heterogeneity; see the review by House-Peters and Chang (2011) and Fuente (2019). Exceptions
include Renwick and Archibald (1998); Mansur and Olmstead (2012); Klaiber et al. (2014), and
Wichman, Taylor and von Haefen (2016). Similar issues exist for residential energy demand; see
Reiss and White (2005); Borenstein (2012); Auffhammer and Rubin (2018) and Swan and Ugursal
(2009).
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household-level longitudinal water demand analysis with similar degree of price variation.5
Additionally, severe drought conditions during part of the sample period triggered the use
of command-and-control (CAC) policies that imposed restrictions on outdoor usage. This
provides an opportunity to also examine the effects of CAC policies. Finally, we use a
hydrological model, calibrated to the local area, to calculate a measure of local hydrological
stress. This enables us to captures the amount of moisture available to residential lawns.6
Our estimates of water demand shed new light on the efficacy and distributional conse-
quences of price-based policies. In particular, we show that households that are most likely
to irrigate (i.e. high wealth, heavy-usage households) are not less price sensitive than other
households, and price sensitivity does not vary across wealth levels. If anything, the point
estimates suggest that heavy-usage households are more price elastic than households that
are less likely to irrigate. For example, we find that wealthy heavy-usage households have
a price elasticity of -0.104, while wealthy low-usage households have a price elasticity of
-0.063 and non-wealthy low-usage households have elasticity equal to -0.046. By contrast,
the previous literature typically finds elasticities in the range of -0.92 to -0.27 for low-wealth
or low-usage households, and elasticities in the range of -0.48 to 0.12 for households with
high-wealth or high-usage. Elasticities for this latter group presumed to have higher prefereces
for outdoor water usage are generally statistically indistinguishable from zero.7 Why are our
5Seasonal pricing is also sometimes referred to as “peak-load” or “time-of-use” pricing. Previous
studies of residential water demand under seasonal pricing (Renzetti, 1992; Lyman, 1992; Reynaud,
2010) have focused on aggregate demand rather than household-level demand.
6Previous water demand studies vary in how they model environmental factors. See Arbués, Garcıa-
Valiñas and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003), Worthington and Hoffman (2008), or House-Peters and
Chang (2011) for comprehensive reviews of the literature.
7See Mansur and Olmstead (2012); Baerenklau, Schwabe and Dinar (2014); Klaiber et al. (2014);
Wichman, Taylor and von Haefen (2016).
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results different from the previous literature? One potential explanation is that our joint
characterization of households in terms of both wealth and usage profiles more effectively
isolates households’ preferences for outdoor water usage from their price sensitivities. Indeed,
we show that ignoring this heterogeneity can lead to differences in the price elasticity estimates.
Another possible explanation is that the large price increases we observe provide a better
opportunity to accurately estimate elasticities.
We complement our elasticity estimates with descriptive evidence of transitions in usage
profiles over time. This provides insight into the extent to which households make substantial
changes in water usage following the introduction of higher prices. These descriptions reveal
that a large share of households, in each wealth level, reduced water usage significantly after
the implementation of seasonal pricing.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Water Usage Data
The Orange Water and Sewer Authority (OWASA) in Orange County, North Carolina
has provided monthly water usage and rate data from February 1999 through September 2005
for single-family residential properties. We match this data with each property’s parcel-level
characteristics using Orange County Land Records’ geographic information system. These
characteristics include lot size, square footage, year built, assessed value of the home in 2000,
and the Census Block Group.8 During the sample period, OWASA staff recorded usage from
household water meters approximately monthly, with different households’ usage recorded on
different days of the month. We define monthly usage for each household in terms of these
8In OWASA’s service area there are 42 Block Groups which contain, on average, about 190 households
each.
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read periods. In recording households’ usage data, OWASA truncates to the nearest thousand
gallons the total quantity of water used during a read period. Usage above a truncation point
carries-over to the next read period, which effectively delays payment rather than allowing
some usage to be unbilled entirely.
To prepare the sample we use for empirical analysis, we remove observations that may be
incomplete or contain errors. First, we eliminate households that, despite OWASA’s billing
designation, may not be single-family households.9 Next, we drop households with usage
data that begins later than October 1st, 1999. This insures that we observe all households
for more than two years prior to OWASA implementing seasonal pricing in May 2002. From
this set of households, we exclude those with any missing data between October 1999 and
September 2005. We eliminate outliers by dropping households with monthly usage values
that ever exceed the 99.9th percentile of usage; some of these extreme outliers are due to
meter misreads or catastrophic leaks. We also drop households with zero-usage readings in
2+ consecutive periods or 12+ periods in total, in order to exclude households with frequent
absences due to travel or intermittent rental activity.10 Our final sample contains 4,455
households, roughly 52% of the starting data.
2.2.2 Water Prices
OWASA is among the first water utilities to use prices as part of a broader strategy to
manage demand during non-drought periods. On May 1st 2002, OWASA replaced uniform
9For example, we eliminate customers with multiple location identifiers as they may represent
households that own multiple homes or properties managed by rental agencies. We also eliminate
customers whose land record information is inconsistent with a single-family property.
10A zero-usage reading may also be due to meter rounding for very low usage amounts, or it could
indicate a water shutoff due to non-payment.
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year-round prices with seasonal prices that are higher in the summer.11 The decision to
adopt seasonal pricing was part of a longer-term plan to manage water resources and not
in response to a particular event. OWASA sets its prices yearly based on the average cost
of service for the residential sector as a whole. Similar to many utilities, OWASA charges
households a combination of volumetric and fixed fees. The volumetric portion of the bill
includes separate per-unit charges for both water and sewer services. Because households
are billed for both services on the same bill, we follow the literature in assuming that the
effective marginal price is the combined price for water and sewer services.
We show the nominal marginal prices per thousand gallons (KGals) from October 1999
to October 2005 in Figure 2.2.1. Prior to 2002, price changes were limited to small increases
on October 1st of each year. The introduction of seasonal prices, which we refer to as the
treatment, began in May 2002. This pricing scheme features marginal prices that are 40%
greater during summer months (May-September) relative to the rest of the year. Water
prices during non-summer months are largely unchanged with the introduction of seasonal
prices. Fixed fees and volumetric sewer charges remained constant throughout the year. In
our empirical analysis, we convert all prices to January 1999 dollars using the seasonally-
adjusted U.S. city average monthly consumer price index (CPI) from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Approximately two months after the implementation of seasonal pricing in 2002, drought
conditions led to falling reservoir levels, triggering the use of CAC restrictions, indicated with
shading in Figure 2.2.1. Given the coincidence of seasonal pricing and CAC restrictions, we
11In October 2007, OWASA transitioned to a different pricing schedule in which marginal prices
depend on usage, referred to as increasing block pricing.
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Figure 2.2.1: Seasonal Prices and CAC Restrictions
Notes: Prices are nominal US dollars. CAC restrictions were imposed from July 11th 2002 through
June 2003. The dip in the marginal price observed in October 2002 was due to a brief
administrative error.
identify households’ responses to seasonal pricing through their usage choices after OWASA
lifted the CAC restrictions.
2.2.3 Command-and-Control Restrictions
CAC restrictions target outdoor water usage to encourage conservation. These restrictions
are determined by reservoir levels and are independent of OWASA’s introduction of seasonal
prices. Violations of CAC restrictions were considered misdemeanors and enforced through
fines by the local townships and Orange County. OWASA implemented CAC restrictions
in three stages, with stricter requirements imposed during each subsequent stage. On July
11th, 2002, the first restriction, Stage 1, was implemented, restricting irrigation of lawns,
gardens, trees, or shrubs to three days out of each week. Approximately one month later, the
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second restriction, Stage 2, was implemented, further restricting irrigation to only one day a
week. Two weeks after the implementation of Stage 2, OWASA implemented water supply
Emergency restrictions as reservoir levels continued to fall. This restriction prohibited the use
of outdoor water for any purposes other than fire suppression or necessary emergency activities.
OWASA began the process of lifting CAC restrictions after heavy rains in October 2002 ended
the drought. Definitions of each CAC restriction and a timeline of their implementation are
in Appendix 2.3.
Following the 2002 drought, OWASA revised its restriction policy in June 2003 to include
a Year-Round Conservation Requirement. The conservation requirement strongly encouraged
the use of reclaimed or harvested water, the installation of water-saving fixtures, and limitation
of activities such as spray irrigation to three days per week during non-drought conditions.
Outdoor usage behavior following the drought, therefore, may have been influenced by factors
other than prices. To supplement the main analysis, discussed below, we estimate several
specifications to ensure that our results are robust to our treatment of the conservation
requirement. The results from these additional specifications do not differ from the main
specification.
2.2.4 Usage Profiles and Wealth
We use Ward’s agglomerative hierachical clustering algorithm (Ward, 1963) to identify
yearly usage patterns during October 1999-September 2001, the two pre-treatment years that
feature constant within-year prices and small price changes between years. We define years
to coincide with how OWASA implemented price changes. Combining the two pre-treatment
years to create a representative year, we apply the clustering algorithm to identify yearly
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usage profiles based on the amount of water used in each respective month.12 We allow the
algorithm to create three usage profiles; additional levels did not add clear value for our
empirical approach. As a practical matter, we need the profiles to capture enough households
so that they can be further divided by other household characteristics (i.e. wealth).13 We
illustrate the usage profiles – which we refer to as Heavy, Moderate, and Light– in Figure
2.2.2.14
The usage profiles are instructive in describing differences in how households use water
over the course of the year. They intuitively describe annual usage patterns, conforming
with informal classifications of residential water usage. The timing and magnitude of water
usage of the Heavy profile, for example, is consistent with lawn care. In particular, the large
quantities of water usage during peak summer months suggests outdoor irrigation, and the
significant amount usage late in the fall suggests watering of re-seeded lawns in preparation
for the following summer. Conversely, the Light profile reflects consistently low water usage
month-to-month, indicative of no outdoor water usage. Finally, the Moderate profile reflects
usage in between the two other profiles. Relative to the Light profile, the Moderate profile
has higher usage during the winter and small but distinct peaks during the summer and fall,
likely reflecting occasional outdoor water use.
12To apply the machine learning clustering algorithm, we convert usage amounts from read periods
to calendar months under the assumption that per-day usage is constant within a read period.
13When we experimented with adding a fourth usage profile, we found that it did not add information
about the timing of water usage within the year, just its level.
14Ward’s agglomerative hierarchical clustering method groups-together time series that are closest
to each other in multivariate Euclidean space. The agglomerative coefficient, a measure of the
clustering structure, for this method is 0.993 in our data, indicating a strong clustering structure.
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Figure 2.2.2: Usage Profiles from Clustering
This profile, which has higher usage than during the winter, has small but noticeable
peaks during early summer and fall, likely reflecting occasional outdoor water usage.
These usage profiles are useful because they also capture household characteristics that
we do not observe directly, such as the number of people in the household or preferences for
outdoor water use. We assign each household to a profile based on its usage from October
2000 to September 2001, immediately before seasonal pricing’s introduction. We use k-nearest
neighbors, a supervised learning algorithm, to perform the match (Batista et al., 2014). As
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a robustness check, we redo all analyses using October 1999 to September 2000 usage to
match households to profiles, and we find that our results are not sensitive to the choice of
pre-treatment year. These results are provided in Appendix 2.4.
We follow the convention in the literature and define household wealth using assessed
value of the home (Jones and Morris, 1984; Dandy, Nguyen and Davies, 1997; Arbúes,
Barberan and Villanua, 2004).15 Specifically, we create an indicator for relative wealth
based on the median assessed home value ($192,647) in the area of study in 2000.16 We
identify a household as High wealth if the home value is above the median, and Low wealth
otherwise. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2.1 summarize parcel-level household characteristics by
wealth level. As indicated by the average house value for lower-wealth households ($131,369),
OWASA’s service area is generally wealthier than the rest of North Carolina (median home
value $108,300) and the United States ($119,600).
As shown in Table 2.2.1, there is a correlation between wealth and higher usage, consistent
with the literature (Dalhuisen et al., 2003; Harlan et al., 2009). However, 25% of the
households with Heavy usage profiles have lower-than-median home values. In addition,
the set of households with higher-than-median home values and Heavy usage profiles only
represent 21% of wealthier households.
15Studies that have explored how price responses interact with wealth measures have used homes’
assessed values or income as a proxy. Wealth may be more appropriate than income in under-
standing a household’s ability to pays its bills, due to former capturing savings, access to credit,
and other financial resources (Meyer and Sullivan, 2003).
16This approach is consistent with previous work. For example, Olmstead and Mansur (2012) define
households with incomes and lot sizes both above the sample medians as “rich, big lot" household
and those with incomes and lot sizes both below the medians are categorized as “poor, small lot."
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Table 2.2.1: Usage and Parcel Characteristics
Wealth Level Usage Profile
All Low High Light Moderate Heavy
Usage (KGals) 5.63 4.65 6.49 3.25 5.93 9.78
(4.31) (3.30) (4.87) (2.22) (3.45) (6.40)
House size (sq. ft.) 2346 1700 2910 1923 2444 2923
(878.20) (494.57) (740.38) (748.10) (792.35) (983.17)
Number of bedrooms 3.56 3.14 3.93 3.24 3.64 3.97
(0.96) (0.85) (0.91) (0.91) (0.92) (1.02)
Number of bathrooms 2.55 2.04 3.00 2.19 2.64 3.01
(0.85) (0.66) (0.75) (0.80) (0.76) (0.95)
Yard size (acres) 0.44 0.35 0.51 0.39 0.45 0.50
(0.34) (0.26) (0.39) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34)
House value (1000 206.65 131.37 272.31 162.93 216.27 268.20
USD) (98.18) (36.68) (87.28) (79.08) (90.24) (117.67)
Year built 1975 1969 1981 1972 1977 1979
(18) (17) (17) (18) (18) (17)
Number of households
Total 4455 2080 2375 1481 2301 673
High wealth 478 1389 508
Note: Values are means and standard deviations in parenthesis.
2.2.5 Environmental Conditions
Environmental conditions are important factors that drive demand for outdoor water
usage such as lawn irrigation. The standard approach has been to account for this with an
ad hoc collection of weather variables. By contrast, we introduce a novel measure based on
hydrological stress. This measure more directly captures the water needs of a household’s
lawn. We use a hydrology model to account for how water moves through the hydrological
cycle, while also accounting for land use and vegetation cover patterns. Specifically, we
introduce an index derived from a spatially-explicit eco-hydrological model known as Regional
Hydro-Ecologic Simulation (RHESSys) (Tague and Band, 2004; Lin et al., 2019; Gao et al.,
2018) to summarize the exogenous factors that determine lawn and soil dryness. This
approach builds on previous hydrological research that has found that calculations of soil
water deficits are better than weather variables (which mostly capture atmospheric conditions)
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at identifying periods in which plants are likely to be water-stressed in agricultural settings
(Yao, 1974; Torres, Lollato and Ochsner, 2013).
We construct the index in two steps. First, RHESSys produces estimates of actual
evapotranspiration and potential evaporation, which are measurements of the amount of
moisture transferred from lawns to the atmosphere. The two measurements differ in that
actual evapotranspiration is a conditional measure, limited by the amount of soil moisture
currently available, whereas potential evapotranspiration is an unconditional measure that
reflects the maximum amount of moisture that could theoretically be transferred. To produce
these estimates, the model combines a high-resolution landcover database (Pickard et al.,
2015; NLCD, 2001) with other model inputs (e.g. precipitation, soil water potential, air
temperature, solar radiation) to model spatial and temporal dynamics of soil moisture. We
calibrate and validate the model using United States Geological Survey gauges to derive
estimates of soil moisture specific to lawns. In the second step, we use the resulting estimates
of actual and potential evapotranspiration to produce a “water stress” index, WS ∈ [0, 1],
that captures soil conditions for each Census Block Group in OWASA’s service area. A
value of WS = 0 indicates minimally stressed (i.e., wet) conditions, and WS = 1 indicates
maximally stressed (dry) conditions. In Appendix 2.1, we provide further details on water
stress as well as an illustration of its temporal and spatial heterogeneity. In our estimation
models, we also include a measure of average temperature to capture demand for seasonal
recreational water uses (e.g. water used to fill swimming pools or car washing) that water
stress does not capture.
The use of water stress presumes that households water their lawns when their plants are
stressed. It is possible, however, that households respond to weather variables instead. We
also collect weather data and construct environmental controls like those typically used in the
literature. In Appendix 2.5, we compare our results to estimates obtained when controlling for
environmental factors using ad hoc collections of weather variables. We show that commonly
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used collections of weather variables generally produce smaller estimates of price sensitivity
among wealthier households with Heavy and Moderate usage profiles. We also show that is
possible for collections of several weather variables to approximate our results when we use
water stress. The advantage of using water stress is that it summarizes environmental factors
in a single variable. This allows us to estimate differential responses to environmental factors
in a parsimonious way.
2.3 Water Demand Estimation
We estimate a demand function for water. In considering the demand model’s components
and parameterization, it is useful to consider households’ constrained optimization problem.
We assume that households are heterogeneous in two dimensions: their taste for landscaping
and their budget constraints. In our empirical model, we allow usage profiles and house
values, respectively, to proxy for these sources of heterogeneity. In addition to the utility from
landscaping (and other consumption, including indoor water use) and the budget constraint, a
household must consider the “technology” that produces healthy landscaping. This technology
requires water as an input, and in general the need for watering or irrigation is greater during
hot, dry weather. As the price of water increases, households with different landscaping tastes
and budget constraints may respond differently to this price variation. This motivates one
characteristic of our empirical specification, which allows a different price elasticity term for
each usage-wealth combination. Similar to the heterogeneous effect of prices, when changes in
environmental conditions affect water’s productivity in maintaining a lush lawn, households
of different tastes or wealth may respond differently in their water choices. This motivates a
second characteristic of our empirical specification, which allows a different response to water
stress for each usage-wealth combination. Some households may view command-and-control
restrictions as hard limits on the total amount of outdoor water to be used, but others may
view CAC policies as an increase in water’s price, whether through levied fines or their
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neighbors’ opprobrium. Therefore, households’ responses to CAC restrictions may also vary
with usage-wealth combinations.
We assume that household i’s demand for water during read period t is a function of
water’s contemporaneous marginal price.17 To account for demand heterogeneity, the demand
model’s parameters vary with a household’s usage profile,
u ∈ {Heavy,Moderate,Light}, and its wealth, w ∈ {High, Low}. For each household and
combination of u and w, we define a set of indicator variables, τiuw, that are equal to one if i


















τiuwZitθuw + ηi + εit, (2.1)
The dependent variable, qit, is the log of the total quantity of water demanded by household
i during read period t. The variable pt is the log of the marginal price in effect during read
period t. The coefficient βuw therefore represents price-elasticity for wealth level w and usage
profile u.
The vector Xit records CAC restrictions, k ∈ {Stage 1, Stage 2, Emergency}, that were
implemented during the drought. The restrictions are mutually exclusive, and we record in
Xit the number of days restriction k was in place during each read period. The coefficient
φuwk represents the percent change in usage per day due to CAC restriction k for households
with wealth level w and usage profile u. Responses to CAC policies are identified with
17Alternative assumptions, used elsewhere in the literature, include the assumption that households
respond to lagged prices (because they believe that prices printed in recently-received bills also
apply to the current period) or they respond at the margin to an average of fixed and marginal
prices (because the true marginal prices are difficult to decipher).
48
variation across households in exposure to restrictions per read period, due to asynchronous
meter-reading and billing.
The vector Zit contains controls for other factors that influence water demand during
each read period. These include Census Block Group level water stress, average temperature,
and the number of days in each household’s read period t. We standardize the values of both
Census Block Group level water stress and average temperature, demeaning then normalizing
them by their standard errors, to put them on the same scale. Their effects on usage are
interpreted in terms of changes in their standard deviations. We account for intra-year usage
patterns with a sixth-order polynomial in a read period’s average week number. We account
for long-term usage changes with a pair of linear time trends. The first trend applies until the
introduction of the Year-Round Conservation Requirement, and the second for the remainder
of the sample period.18
We leverage the panel nature of the data to control for time-invariant unobserved
household characteristics that may be correlated with water demand. These characteristics
are absorbed by the fixed effect ηi. Lastly, εit is an error term that captures unobservable
demand shocks that households experience during individual read periods.
The results of estimating (2.1) are shown graphically in Figure 2.3.3 - Figure 2.3.5 for
various subsets of variables. The full set of coefficient estimates are in Appendix Table 2.2.1
in Appendix 2.2. Starting with the estimates for the price elasticities shown in Figure 2.3.3,
we see that, all else equal, households with Heavy usage profiles are just as price-sensitive as
other households. Tests for significant differences in the price elasticity estimates for high
18We include distinct intercept and slope terms following the introduction of the Year-Round
Conservation Requirement, which provides greater flexibility in fitting households’ responses to
OWASA’s post-drought policies and messages about conservation.
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wealth households with Heavy usage profiles relative to high wealth households with Moderate
and Light usage profiles yield p-values of 0.48 and 0.22, respectively. If anything, the point
estimates suggest that households with Heavy usage profiles are the most price sensitive,
followed by households with Moderate usage profiles. We estimate that high-wealth, Heavy
households have price elasticity of -0.104, while Moderate and Light high-wealth households
have price elasticities of -0.082 and -0.063, respectively. Similarly, low wealth-households
with Heavy usage profiles have price elasticity of -0.134, whereas low-wealth households with
Moderate and Light usage profiles have elasticities of -0.067 and -0.046, respectively. These
findings are particularly important as they suggest prices are no less effective at curbing the
water usage by households with Heavy usage profiles than other households. We find very
little heterogeneity across wealth levels. A test of the difference in price elasticity estimates
for high and low wealth households with Heavy usage profiles yields a p-value of 0.53. This
finding is inconsistent with previous studies that have found that prices induce a larger
reduction in demand among poorer households (Renwick and Archibald, 1998; Mansur and
Olmstead, 2012; Wichman, Taylor and von Haefen, 2016).
One potential explanation for our findings diverge from previous studies is that our
characterization of households in terms of wealth and usage profiles does a better job of
isolating preferences for outdoor water usage that are separate from price sensitivities. Indeed,
the water stress and average temperature coefficients, graphically represented in Figure 2.3.4,
suggest that each wealth and usage profile has distinct preferences for outdoor water usage.
For instance, households with high wealth and heavy usage profiles increase water usage
the most due to drier environmental conditions, possibly due to the stress to their plants
or landscape. Conversely, households with high wealth and light usage profiles are least
responsive to drier environmental conditions.
To illustrate the validity of this explanation, we show that ignoring differential impacts
of environmental factors leads to bias in price elasticity estimates due to positive correlation
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Figure 2.3.3: Water Price Elasticities
Note: Geosolids represent point estimates and lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
between higher prices and drier environmental conditions. If we do not allow environmental
factors’ impacts to vary by wealth, for example, we essentially assume that changes in
environmental conditions have the same effect on both high- and low-wealth households for a
given usage profile. If wealthier households have stronger preferences for outdoor usage, this
specification would understate the true effect of drier conditions on their demand for water.
During peak summer months when prices are higher and conditions are drier, one would then
incorrectly attribute increases in usage to increases in price, and conclude that households
that irrigate are insensitive to price. This would also explain why some studies find positive
price elasticity estimates for households presumed to irrigate (Wichman, Taylor and von
Haefen, 2016). Although other studies did not estimate demand under seasonal pricing, they
estimate demand demand under increasing block pricing, a price structure in which marginal
prices depend on usage. The same effect would be observed under increasing block prices
since households with higher usage levels face higher prices. The opposite would be true
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Figure 2.3.4: Effect of Environmental Factors on Water Usage
Note: Point estimates (geosolids) represent percentage change in water usage per standard
deviation change in environmental control. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
for lower wealth households, as the estimates would imply overly-strong responses to dry
conditions. Then, when prices and dryness increase in the summer, the absence of increased
usage would be attributed to strong price elasticity in order to counter-balance the upward
bias in expected response to environmental conditions (Appendix Table 2.2.2). A similar
argument holds for not allowing responses to water stress to vary by usage profile, as this
specification assumes that changes in environmental conditions affect households with similar
wealth levels in the same way. As shown in Table 2.2.1, not all high wealth households have
the same preference for outdoor water usage. Following similar reasoning, we show that not
allowing for differences in usage profiles results in biased price elasticity estimates (Appendix
Table 2.2.3).
Turning now to the effect of CAC restrictions used during the 2002 drought, we find
little wealth-based heterogeneity. As shown in Figure 2.3.5, the estimated reductions in
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Figure 2.3.5: Effect of Command and Control Policies on Water Usage
Note: Geosolids represent point estimates and lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
usage attributable to each CAC restriction do not differ across wealth levels, except in the
case of high wealth households with heavy usage who reduced consumption significantly
more their low wealth counterparts. Instead, we find them to be increasing as a function of
both the severity level of the restriction as well as usage profiles. Reductions attributable to
Stage 1 and Stage 2 restrictions are relatively modest relative to reductions from the water
supply Emergency restriction. Furthermore, we find evidence that all households reduced
consumption during the declared Emergency, including households with Light usage profiles.
Finally, our results also suggest some heterogeneity in how usage trends changed after
the drought. The introduction of the Year-Round Conservation Requirement led to a decrease
in usage for all wealth and usage groups, with the largest changes for wealthier households
(see Appendix Table 2.2.1). Usage was generally lower for all groups once the conservation
requirement was enacted.
2.4 Additional Evidence on Usage Profiles
For the elasticity estimation conducted in Section 2.3, we grouped households according
to their usage profiles. Though the results suggest that households with Heavy usage profiles
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were most sensitive to price (given the point estimates), the way in which these households
reduced usage is unclear. In this section, we examine how households move across usage
profiles over time to provide supplementary information about the effects of seasonal pricing
on usage. This information is relevant to water utilities, which are concerned with both price
elasticities and peak-usage timing when setting policies for reservoir management. We use a
k-nearest neighbors algorithm to match each household’s usage in each year to one of the
three usage profiles previously identified (Heavy Moderate and Light ).
We start by providing the fractions of households in each usage profile over time in Table
2.4.2. Panel A shows that, in the first year of the sample, 34% of households had Light usage
profiles. This fraction stayed relatively constant for two more years before increasing to about
45%. Overall, the fractions are generally stable in the sample’s first couple of years, move
around in the middle two “transition years” – October 2001-September 2002 and October
2002-September 2003 – and then are generally stable at a new level in the sample’s final years.
These patterns suggest a qualitative shift in usage following the introduction of seasonal
pricing. Panels B and C show that a similar effect holds within both high- and low-wealth
households.
The two transition years are particularly interesting because they were affected by
the introduction of seasonal prices, the onset of drought, and the implementation of CAC
restrictions. Although we do not explicitly decompose these various effects on how households
sort into usage profiles, it is important to note that there are two opposing forces at play
during the summer months of seasonal pricing’s first year (October 2001-September 2002). On
one hand, the onset of drought conditions put upwards pressure on usage. From Section 2.3,
we expect that this “drought effect" would primarily affect high-wealth households with
outdoor usage, as drier conditions increase watering needs for landscaping. On the other
hand, the implementation of higher seasonal prices and CAC restrictions put downward
pressure on usage. For the full population (Panel A), we note a small, but noticeable, increase
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Table 2.4.2: Usage Profile Shares
Light Moderate Heavy
Panel A All Households (N=4455)
Oct99-Sep00 0.34 0.49 0.17
Oct00-Sep01 0.33 0.52 0.15
Oct01-Sep02 0.34 0.49 0.17
Oct02-Sep03 0.49 0.44 0.07
Oct03-Sep04 0.45 0.44 0.10
Oct04-Sep05 0.45 0.45 0.10
Panel B Lower Wealth Households (N=2080)
Oct99-Sep00 0.48 0.43 0.09
Oct00-Sep01 0.48 0.44 0.08
Oct01-Sep02 0.49 0.43 0.08
Oct02-Sep03 0.61 0.35 0.04
Oct03-Sep04 0.59 0.36 0.05
Oct04-Sep05 0.59 0.37 0.04
Panel C Higher Wealth Households (N=2375)
Oct99-Sep00 0.21 0.55 0.24
Oct00-Sep01 0.20 0.58 0.21
Oct01-Sep02 0.21 0.54 0.25
Oct02-Sep03 0.37 0.52 0.11
Oct03-Sep04 0.34 0.51 0.15
Oct04-Sep05 0.33 0.52 0.15
in the fraction of households with Heavy usage profiles during the transition years, and
essentially no change in the fraction of households with Light usage profiles. These patterns
suggest that the upward pressure exerted by the drought was generally greater than the
downward pressure exerted by increased prices. Consistent with the results in Section 2.3,
panels B and C show that the “drought effect" was particularly strong among high-wealth
households.
In the following year (October 2002-September 2003), changes in usage profiles reveal
large, observable decreases in usage. Since the drought officially ended in October 2002, these
changes can be attributed to either seasonal prices or CAC restrictions. In particular, CAC
restrictions were in place from October through the end of June, which would have affected
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Table 2.4.3: Transitions in Usage Profiles
Oct00-Sep01 Light (N=1481) Moderate (N=2301) Heavy (N=673)
L M H L M H L M H
Oct01-Sep02 0.82 0.17 0.00 0.12 0.76 0.11 0.01 0.24 0.75
Oct02-Sep03 0.89 0.11 0.00 0.35 0.62 0.03 0.05 0.56 0.39
Oct03-Sep04 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.31 0.63 0.06 0.04 0.49 0.46
Oct04-Sep05 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.31 0.64 0.06 0.06 0.49 0.44
the ability to irrigate during critical periods. We observe small increases in Heavy usage
profiles between October 2002-September 2003 and October 2003-September 2004, suggesting
a return to outdoor water usage following the lifting of CAC restrictions. Panels B and C
indicate that wealthier households increased usage more strongly than low-wealth households.
To shed additional light on the reduction in usage after the implementation of seasonal
pricing, we report in Table 2.4.3 changes in household-level usage profiles relative to usage
profiles in the year prior to treatment (October 2000-September 2001). We illustrate how to
understand the entries in this table using the transitions of households with Heavy usage
profiles. As shown in the “Oct00-Sep01” row, 673 households were classified as having a
Heavy profile during October 2000-September 2001. Of the households in the “Oct00-Sep01”
row, 75% were in that same profile the following year (“Oct 01-Sep02"), while 24% moved to
Moderate , and 1% moved to Light. The next row, labeled “Oct02-Sep03,” shows that 56%
of initially-Heavy usage households in “Oct00-Sep01” row moved to the Moderate profile
during the second year of seasonal pricing. Among households identified as Moderate prior to
seasonal pricing, many more reduced their usage to Light than increased to Heavy . Similarly,
relatively few households initially identified as Light moved to a higher usage profile. We
provide a table of transitions by wealth in Appendix 2.6.
The information in Table 2.4.3 corroborates the finding that there seems to have been a
permanent downward shift in usage for many households. It also provides further insight
into the overall impact that seasonal pricing had on usage. In particular, the adoption of
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seasonal pricing was effective at reducing usage during peak summer months, resulting in
observable decreases in Heavy usage profiles among both high- and low-wealth households.
Examining transitions also provides additional information on the effects of price that were
not detectable in Table 2.4.2 during the onset of drought conditions. In particular, we observe
some households increasing usage and others decreasing usage in the “Oct01-Sep02” row.
This would suggest that increased prices may have been effective at mitigating the effect
of drought on usage, although some of these decreases may have been attributable to CAC
restrictions.
2.5 Conclusion
Water utilities are increasingly using price-based demand management strategies as an
alternative to infrastructure expansions. Evaluating these strategies requires an understanding
of the consequences of price increases. In this study, we estimate demand for residential water
using household-level panel data. The richness of our data allows us to estimate elasticities
that vary by both household wealth and usage profile. Our results indicate that households
with higher usage profiles are no less price-sensitive than low-usage households, for any wealth
level. Relative to previous research, these results provide a more optimistic assessment of the
utilities’ ability to use prices to reduce water consumption by high-usage households.
We complement the analysis with an examination of how households are matched to
usage profiles over time. Following the introduction of higher marginal prices during summer
months, a large fraction of households with heavy usage transitioned to usage profiles with
lower and flatter usage. Moreover, we observe similar transition patterns across wealth levels.
Our findings have implications for several areas of related research. First, from the
perspective of a water utility, the effect of a price change on revenues is an important
consideration because utilities tend to recoup a large percentage of their fixed costs from
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variable charges (Beecher, 2010). Second, water utilities may be concerned with the welfare
impacts of higher prices on various customer classes. In contrast to previous findings, we
show that poorer households have similar demand elasticities as wealthier households. This
provides the basis for future research exploring welfare implications of price changes and the
affordability of water services.
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PAPER 3: COMPLIANCE WITH STATE MANDATES FOR WATER
CONSERVATION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL OPPROBRIUM
3.1 Introduction
Decentralized management of natural resources is often promoted as a policy objective
because local agencies have better knowledge of the environmental and socio-economic
problems that they face than do higher-level government institutions (Ostrom, 2000; Kwon,
Berry and Feiock, 2009). However, local agencies may make decisions based on short-term
objectives that often result in socially inefficient outcomes (e.g. Yaffee, 1997). Consequently,
higher-level government institutions (e.g. state, federal, or national governments) intervene to
coordinate local actions through a centralized, top-down mandates with specific requirements
(Brewer and Stern, 2005). Significant implementation gaps, however, arise between legislative
objectives and real-world outcomes because compliance with mandates is not automatic
(Stewart, 1977; Cullingworth, 1994). Local agencies’ priorities often diverge from those of
higher-level governments (Vig and Kraft, 2012; Burby et al., 2013).1
In this paper, I provide new insights into the extent to which local agencies comply
with centralized government mandates in the context of water conservation.2 Overall, I do
not find evidence that mandating objectives leads to intended results. Moreover, I show
1Diverging priorities is especially prominent in the context of planning for natural hazards (Rossi
et al., 1982; Cigler, Stiftel and Burby, 1987; Godschalk, Brower and Beatley, 1989).
2In the United States, states have the legal authority to establish priorities for how water is used
among users at various spatial scales (e.g. Hanemann, Dyckman and Park, 2015)
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that compliance is higher in service areas where customers actively complain about “water
waste” than in service areas where customers do not. During droughts, water utilities often
encourage customers to anonymously report instances where other customers are using water
in ways that are deemed “wasteful” as a passive enforcement mechanism. In this context,
private citizen activism appears to be an overlooked aspect of local agency compliance.
I study the use of mandates for water conservation using data on urban water utilities
in California subject to a drought-related conservation mandate–Executive Order (EO) B-
29-15. Under EO B-29-15, the State of California mandated that large urban water utilities
collectively reduce water production (i.e. conserve water) by 25% between June 2015 through
May 2016 (SWRCB, 2015a).3 Typically, this 25% target would be uniformly applied to all
water utilities. However, the designated state agency–State Water Resource Control Board
(SWRCB)–assigned each water utility a different conservation target using a multi-threshold
assignment rule based on the average amount of water used by residential users (SWRCB,
2015b).4 Each utility, in turn, was responsible for managing demand among their residential
customers. This institutional feature of EO B-29-15 provides an opportunity to study a large
number of heterogeneous local agencies facing a common drought shock with potentially
different externally imposed incentives to pursue water conservation.
Over the course of EO B-29-15, urban water utilities collectively achieved reduced water
production by 24.5%, just shy of the intended 25% objective. From a policy perspective,
EO B-29-15 was notable because it was the first in a series of policy decisions to promote
3Produced water refers to the total amount of potable water from groundwater, surface water, and
water purchased from other water utilities. Water that was produced but not used in a service
area did not count towards the total.
4This is measured in terms of residential gallons per capita per day (R-GPCD).
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“conservation as a way of life” in California.5 At the water utility level, however, the extent
to which the mandate itself led to increased conservation is unclear because there were many
cases of both under and over compliance. For instance, approximately 18% of water utilities
subjected to EO B-29-15 reduced water production by more than 10% above the conservation
target assigned to them while 28% failed to meet their target. Studying California’s experience
with EO B-29-15 can help shed light on the extent to which mandated objectives explain
conservation outcomes. Understanding the extent to which mandating objectives induces
conservation at the water utility level can inform future conservation policy.
My approach builds on previous work that examines decentralized management through
the lens of principal agent theory (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007; Estache, Garsous
and da Motta, 2016).6 Unable to perfectly control or monitor local water utilities, state
governments need the cooperation of local-water utilities to implement programs to achieve
desired policy objectives and provide sufficient incentives to do so. Mandates promote
conservation through two mechanisms: (1) increasing political acceptance of local conservation
efforts by shifting some of the responsibility from local water utilities to the state agency, and
(2) enforcement through a coercive regulatory approach consisting of a threat of monetary
fines and legal action against the water utility as punishment mechanisms for noncompliance.7
Divergent priorities in the context of drought manifests through conflicting incentives that
5“Making conservation a way of life” is a slogan used the State Water Resources Control Board and
the Department of Water Resources.
6Other studies largely focus on welfare implications. Water conservation mandates, for instance,
often curtail or limit access to water. These limitations in water access are conceptualized as supply
disruptions that may translate into significant welfare losses (Buck, Nemati and Sunding, 2016)
but reduced greenhouse gas emissions (Spang, Holguin and Loge, 2018).
7This characterization is based on May and Williams’s (1986) conceptual framework of state
approaches for managing natural hazard risks. See Berke et al. (2006) and Dyckman (2016) for
reviews on how state mandates are characterized.
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local water utilities may face to conserve water. On the one hand, water utilities want to
ensure continuity of service and avoid supplies falling below minimum reserve levels. On the
other hand, water utilities face several disincentives for engaging in conservation depending on
local situational factors (Dalton and Burby, 1994). Notably, water utilities may be sensitive
to social and political pressures exerted by their customers against aggressively pursuing
conservation (Mullin, 2009; Teodoro, Zhang and Switzer, 2018).
Given the uncertainty in drought duration, water utility managers therefore often “weigh
the risks of delay against the potential public relations problems caused by ‘false alarms’
” (TCEQ, 2005). As a result, water utilities often delay pursuing conservation as long as
possible (Walker, Hrezo and Haley, 1991). State governments, however, have a clear stake
in reducing the risks of drought given the significant economic costs, including the costs of
disaster assistance (Schwab et al., 1998; Wilhite, 2000).8
In the case of mandates for water conservation, however, there is a second problem as
water utilities must rely on their customers to reduce their water consumption to achieve
desired outcomes. To pursue conservation, water utilities may implement one or more strate-
gies to manage demand, including public awareness campaigns, rebates for turf replacement
or water efficient fixtures, mandatory watering restrictions (caps on usage), and pricing
strategies. These strategies are referred to as demand-side management (DSM) strategies.
The amount of conservation achieved at the water utility level is therefore ultimately due to
reductions by residential customers. The two-part nature of the problem presents a challenge
for states as they usually do not observe water utilities actions. In the event that states
observe water utilities’ actions, states may not easily interpret these actions because water
8The cost that a typical drought episode incurs on a state’s economy, for instance, is approximately
$9.5 billion (National Integrated Drought Information System, 2018).
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utilities may implement the same strategy with varying degrees of “implementational intensity”
(Halich and Stephenson, 2009). To account for the two-part nature of the problem, I use a
double-principal-agent framework as a heuristic device. This framework has been used in
several studies on managing fisheries (Jensen and Vestergaard, 2001; Bailey et al., 2016). To
my knowledge, this is the first paper to use this framework to study a mandate in the context
of droughts.
Empirically, I assess the extent to which the mandate drove water utilities’ reductions
in produced water by exploiting quasi-experimental policy variation in the assignment of
conservation targets (SWRCB, 2015b). Significantly, water utilities under the California
mandate had no direct control over the specific conservation target they were assigned. At
each cutoff used to assign conservation targets, water utilities with similar average residential
water usage were therefore assigned different conservation targets. This policy therefore
approximates a random assignment mechanism around the cutoffs. Thus, I build treatment
and control groups and estimate the amount of conservation that can be attributed to the
mandate using a regression discontinuity design.
I show that public involvement in reporting instances of “water waste” helps explain
reductions in water production. Water utilities heavily relied on private citizens anonymously
reporting cases of “water waste.” Customers and the public at large were encouraged through
media campaigns to report sightings of water running down the street, sprinklers on during
the middle of the day, or other potential instances of water waste.9 A plausible explanation is
that people who call in with a water waste complaint were likely driven by a combination of
strong sense of environmental responsibility, referred to as “warm glow” in the literature on
9Media campaigns were largely local initiatives. The State Water Resource Control Board and other
state agencies were also involved in media efforts by issuing press releases, giving interviews, and
were also active on social media platforms.
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intrinsic motivation (e.g. Van Der Linden, 2015), and preferences that depend on the actions
of others, referred to “nosy” preferences (e.g. Danchin et al., 2004; Dave and Dodds, 2012).
As a result, increased community involvement should result in higher levels of conservation.
My findings suggest that, in the case of California, the ability of higher-level government
to achieve designated water conservation goals through mandated objectives may be limited
in spite of aggressive efforts to promote conservation at the local level. I find that the
water utilities serving customers that actively participate in the enforcement process by
reporting instances of water waste are able to achieve higher amounts of conservation during
the mandated conservation period. These findings are in line with previous studies on the
efficacy of enforcement (Halich and Stephenson, 2009) and the literature on the importance
of intrinsic motivations for environmental sustainability (Van Der Linden, 2015).
3.2 Conceptual Framework
My approach builds on previous work that examines decentralized management through
principal agent theory. Principal-agent models have been widely used to study situations
in which two parties with differing incentives depend on each other to achieve objectives.
Specifically, one party, the agent, acts on behalf of the second party, the principal, in a
context in which the principal usually cannot perfectly monitor the agent. Moral hazard
arises in situations where agents must undertake costly unobservable actions to cooperate
with the principal (e.g. Stiglitz, 1974).
In the context of water conservation, higher-level governments can be thought of as
acting as a de facto social planner with strong incentives to address externalities that arise
from lack of conservation. For instance, the role of the SWRCB is to develop policies and
regulations “to preserve, enhance, and restore the quality of California’s water resources and
drinking water for the protection of the environment, public health, and all beneficial uses,
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and to ensure proper water resource allocation and efficient use, for the benefit of present and
future generations” (SWRCB, 2018).10 Because of the decentralized management of water
resources, higher-level governments must rely on the cooperation and ability of water utilities
to implement and achieve desired policy objectives.
Adopting a moral hazard framework, the use of a mandate can be thought of as an
attempt by higher-level governments (principal) to vertically align water utilities’ (agents)
incentives with its own by “contracting” with them based on conservation outcomes. A
challenge for higher-level governments is that they are generally unable to directly observe
if a water utility is complying with its requirements. Notably, the actions taken by water
utilities (henceforth referred to as effort) is generally not observable.
California’s EO B-29-15 deviates from the classic principal-agent model in that effort is
partially observable. As part of the mandate, the SWRCB required water utilities to generate
monthly reports with several key pieces of information. In addition to reporting information
on water production levels in each month, water utilities were required to report the number
of days in the week that their customers could water outdoor landscapes and the number
of actions taken to enforce their policies (e.g. number of warnings and citations issued to
customers). Water utilities, however, were not explicitly required to report on other specific
conservation policies that they used (e.g. pricing, rebates). These reports are the primary
data source used in this study.
Though effort is partially observable, a moral hazard framework is nonetheless useful
as a heuristic device to understand compliance with EO B-29-15. Notably, it is often the
10Though it is well recognized that there may be significant differences between scientific assessments
of environmental problems and legislative objectives (Sebek, 1983; Sorian and Baugh, 2002; Dodson,
Geary and Brownson, 2015), they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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case that a water utility will adopt DSM strategies but not enforce them even in the context
of a state mandate for water conservation. Water utilities may also implement the same
DSM with varying degrees of “implementational intensity” (Halich and Stephenson, 2009).11
Importantly, DSM strategies vary in the amounts of monitoring and enforcement they require.
Price-based strategies, for instance, are appealing because they theoretically require little
enforcement. Implementing price-based strategies can be difficult because of equity concerns
(Maggioni, 2015). Use of mandatory usage restrictions requires water utilities to exert effort
(e.g. dedicate staff and resources) to monitor compliance. Water utilities must also monitor
for compliance with other non-price DSM strategies such as rebates for turf replacement
and indoor water fixtures. The financial and implementational onus of monitoring and
enforcement is borne by the water utilities, with little to no help from the state. Water
utilities must trade off the costs and benefits of complying with the mandate.
The SWRCB used conservation outcomes to evaluate water utilities’ compliance with
the mandate. Using water utility-reported information on monthly water production levels,
the SWRCB reviewed water utilities’ progress with their assigned target on a monthly basis.
The SWRCB sent warning letters to water utilities between 1-5% below their assigned target,
and notices of violations to those less than 5% of their assigned target.12 Water utilities’
performance was ultimately judged at the end of the mandate in May 2016. Specific actions
depended on the size of the implementation gap, ranging from providing the SWRCB with
further information documenting their effort to in person meetings.
11Differences may include the scope of the DSM and efforts to communicate the program was
promoted to customers.
12Water utilities who were within 1% or that had production savings in excess of their target received
notices of congratulations.
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There are three possible explanations for implementation gaps. First, it is possible
that local agencies may be unable to comply with mandated requirements due to financial
or institutional capacity constraints (Faguet, 2014). Notably, many water utilities struggle
financially or have insufficient staff to enforce policies. Second, implementation gaps may
arise because local agencies may be unwilling to comply with mandated requirements due
to diverging priorities (Vig and Kraft, 2012; Burby et al., 2013). Third, implementation
gaps may also arise if the state is unwilling to enforce regulations and hold local agencies
accountable for failing to meet mandated objectives (Berke, 1998; May and Williams, 2012).
Notably, enforcing the “contract” may result in lengthy and costly legal action that the
SWRCB would like to avoid.13
An additional challenge for the state is that water utilities’ ability to conserve, in
turn, depends on end-users (i.e. customers). Water utilities (principal) must rely on their
customers (agents) to reduce their water consumption to achieve desired outcomes, potentially
undertaking costly and unobservable actions to do so. Water utilities observe household water
usage and can, in turn, “contract” with their customers on outcomes, enforcing their policies
in the event of non-compliance. Furthermore, there may be multiple types of customers, some
that may be easily encouraged to comply and others that might not. The two-part nature
of the problem presents a challenge for the SWRCB because the level of effort that a water
utility must exert will depend on characteristics of its customer base that the SWRCB may
not observe. I provide a graphical depiction of the double principal-agent in Figure 3.2.1,
adapted from Jensen and Vestergaard (2001).
13To my knowledge, there is only one instance in which the SWRCB took legal action against a
water utility for failing to comply with their mandated conservation target (SWRCB, 2015c).
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Figure 3.2.1: Illustration of Double Principal-Agent Model
3.2.1 Water Utility Incentives
During drought, water utilities can respond by increasing capacity or by promoting
conservation. Despite the wide range of DSM strategies available, water utilities may face
disincentives to voluntarily engage in conservation. For instance, increased conservation
implies reduced revenue as less water is sold, putting financial pressures on water utilities
that may be financially insecure (Kenney, Klein and Clark, 2004). The total amount of
forgone net revenue due to conservation during EO B-29-15 is estimated to have been more
than $500 billion (Moss et al., 2015). Moreover, pursuing conservation may be met with
social pressure and have political consequences. For example, commercial customers may
oppose conservation as it may be perceived as being at odds with economic growth and
development. Residential customers may resist outdoor watering restrictions because of either
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strong preferences for lush green lawns or perceived threat to lifestyles (Brown and Hess,
2017).
Consequently, strategies that increase capacity often provide stronger incentives than
demand-side strategies (Chesnutt and Beecher, 1998). For example, severe droughts prompt
increased interest in reducing non-revenue water (water losses due to leaks), interest in water-
sharing agreements (Zeff et al., 2016; Mozenter et al., 2018; Gold et al., 2019; Gorelick et al.,
2019), and investments in water recycling and reuse, rainwater and stormwater harvesting,
and desalination.14 Supply-side measures, however, may do little to alleviate short-term
constraints as they involve projects that are typically longer-term in nature. Moreover,
pursuing supply-side measures can lead to the imposition of externalities on other water
utilities and water users because of the shared nature of water resources. There is some
evidence to suggest that resource scarcity reduces incentives to cooperate and exacerbates
tendencies to act on short-term incentives by adopting a “race to the bottom for extraction-
profit” strategy (Maldonado and del Pilar Moreno-Sanchez, 2016). During droughts, water
utilities may increase withdrawals from shared water supply sources or excessively withdraw
groundwater supplies.
Water utilities, however, also have incentives to pursue conservation voluntarily as
they want to ensure continuity of service and avoid supplies falling below minimum reserve
levels. These incentives tend to encourage water utilities to pursue increased conservation as
droughts condition worsen. Water utilities may also face pressure from other water utilities
and stakeholders to reduce withdrawals from shared water supply sources. There is also
evidence that water utilities have opted to conserve water during droughts in spite of potential
14The Australian government, for instance, invested billions of dollars in water sources such
as recycling and desalination in an effort to diversify their water supply portfolio during the
“millennium drought” (Radcliffe, 2015).
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political costs of doing so. For instance, Mullin (2009) shows that water utilities in Texas
adopted water usage restrictions despite strong political resistance to any policies that restrict
water use. Mandating water conservation can help increase political acceptance of local
conservation efforts by shifting some of the responsibility from local water utilities to the
state agency (Berke, 1998).
3.2.2 Household Incentives
Assuming a water utility implements one or more DSM strategies, there are two main
channels through which residential households may be encouraged to conserve: extrinsic
and intrinsic motivation. For example, households may conserve as a result of increased
prices, usage restrictions, or the incentives to adopt new technologies due to rebates. These
households would require little monitoring and enforcement.
However, the efficacy of policies that rely on extrinsic motivation may be mitigated by
external factors. For example, homeowner’s associations (HOAs) may require certain amount
of water usage to maintain lawns.15 It may also be the case that “significant expansion of
[water] supplies can inadvertently undermine various demand management policies” (Katz,
2016). Notably, if end-users are aware of potential increases in supply, they may discount
the importance of conservation. Palazzo et al. (2017) find that water utilities subject to
EO B-29-15 with greater source diversity achieved less conservation. As a result of such
mitigating factors, water utilities monitor for compliance and enforce their policies through
reminders, warnings, and penalties. Household responses to these efforts may vary depending
on the credibility of the threat, the probability of enforcement, and the size of the penalty.
15A law was passed to prohibit HOA from taking fining households for lack of lawn care during
droughts in June 2015. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that HOAs may still have exerted
pressure on households to continue watering their lawns during droughts and discourage turf
replacement (Abel, 2015).
70
Households may also conserve water due to intrinsic motivations (De Young, 1985;
Corral-Verdugo et al., 2002). Throughout the drought, water utilities relied on public
awareness campaigns to spread awareness and the need for conservation.16 Previous studies,
for instance, have shown that the amount of newspaper coverage (Tang, Zhang, and Xu, 2015)
and use of social media (Quesnel and Ajami, 2017) may have played an important role in
promoting public interest in water conservation. End-users driven by a sense of environmental
responsibility, i.e. warm glow, may conserve as a result of receiving information about drought
conditions.
Some customers may not only be intrinsically motivated to reduce their own water
consumption but may also have “nosy” preferences, i.e. preferences that depend on other
customers’ actions (e.g. Danchin et al., 2004; Dave and Dodds, 2012). These customers’
preferences could manifest through overt opprobrium or, more discretely, through reports to
local water utilities. During the drought, private citizens (customers and the public at large)
were encouraged to report sightings of water running down the street, sprinklers on during
the middle of the day, or other potential instances of water waste.17 Water utilities could
then use this information to follow-up on these reported sightings. This strategy provides an
opportunity for citizens with “nosy” preferences to be part of the enforcement process.
3.2.3 Testable Predictions
I rely on a double-principle framework to construct a typology of water utilities based
on their level of effort (rows) and of the incentives that may drive residential households to
conserve (columns), summarized in Table 3.2.1. To create this typology, I assume a sample of
16These campaigns may range from ads on radio and/or TV, sending out flyers, hanging up banners,
or sending staff to engage with private citizens at farmer’s markets.
17These reported sightings were reported to either the state or water utilities directly.
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two household subpopulations, one driven by extrinsic motivations only and another that is
also driven by intrinsic motivations. In columns 1 and 3, I assume that both subpopulations
coexist whereas in columns 2 and 4, I assume that the subpopulation driven by intrinsic
motivations is nonexistent. In columns 1 and 2, the population that is driven by extrinsic
motivations is motivated by the incentives of DSMs alone. In columns 3 and 4, the incentives
of DSMs alone are insufficient, so utilities will require additional enforcement to conserve
water. In each box, I generate predictions for the relative amount of effort the water utility
will exert as well as the relative number of cases of water waste reported by the public.
In boxes 1 and 2, water utilities willing and able to comply with the mandated requirement
do not have to necessarily exert much effort as households respond to DSM incentives. In box
1, citizens motivated by warm glow report any sighted cases of water waste further reducing
the need to exert effort to monitor compliance.
In boxes 3 and 4, water utilities that wish to cooperate must now exert effort to implement
their policies and households do not respond to the incentives signaled by DSMs. Water
utilities in these boxes may fail to conserve sufficiently, but not for lack of effort.
In boxes 5-8, water utilities are not sufficiently motivated to pursue conservation, yet
may still reach conservation targets. For instance, in a service area represented by box 5, a
water utility may not follow up with publicly reported cases of water waste from intrisincally
motivated households. In spite of low effort, compliance may still be achieved in this scenario
because households respond to DSM incentives. In comparison, a service area represented by
box 7 still has intrinsically motivated households but the population does not respond to
DSM incentives. These water utilities will likely have a problem complying with the mandate.
The challenge for the state in evaluating whether conservation targets were achieved
due to compliance with the mandated requirements is that service areas with very different
underlying water utility and household behavior are difficult to distinguish. For example,
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Table 3.2.1: Typology of Service Areas: Effort Exerted by Water Utilities and Reporting by
Households
Residential Population
Respond to DSM Strategies Do Not Respond to DSM Strategies
Intrinsic Motivations Intrinsic Motivations











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low effort Low effort High effort High effort





(5) (6) (7) (8)
Low effort Low effort Low effort Low effort
High reports Low reports High reports Low reports
Note: Effort refers to relative number of followups taken water utilities and reports refer to the
relative number of complaints received from private citizens.
service area types 1, 5 and 7 would all have similar measures of underlying behavior (e.g.
monthly effort reports from utilities and a count of citizen complaints). Of these, it is probable
that service areas 1 and 5 would achieve compliance. However, only utilities in service area 1
would have been responsive to the mandate. Most importantly, in either case, conservation is
likely attributable to household behavior and not to the mandate. Using this framework, I
can test two assumptions related to these issues:
• Do mandates resolve the first principal-agent problem? If so, higher conservation target
should mean more conservation.
• Do “nosy” preferences matter? If not, there should be no difference in the amount of
conservation between water utilities with high and low amounts public reporting of




3.3.1 State Water Resource Control Board
The SWRCB dataset consists of information for all water utilities serving at least 3,000
residential connections that are subject to the mandate.18 This information includes each
water utility’s primary water system identifier assigned by U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s Safe Drinking Water Information System, monthly self-reported water production,
average residential usage, 2013 production levels, conservation target, number of residential
customers. The dataset also contains information on the number of reported cases of water
waste reported by the general public and information on enforcement as well as an optional
comment section for additional information related to enforcement.
3.3.1.1 Conservation Targets
Overall, statewide conservation amounted to 24.5% (SWRCB, 2016b). Figure 3.3.2 shows
average reductions in monthly water production relative to the corresponding month in 2013
for both the year before the mandated conservation period (prior to May 2015) and during
the mandated conservation period. Though there was variation in the monthly reductions,
water utilities generally reduced water production more during the mandated conservation
than during the previous year.
The SWRCB created a tier-based list of conservation targets based on specific ranges
of average residential gallons per capita per day (R-GPCD) during July – September 2014
(SWRCB, 2015b). R-GPCD is calculated as total water sold to the residential sector divided
18A total of 16 water utilities are dropped from the analysis. Four water utilities are dropped
because they received exemptions from initial conservation target were granted. An additional 12
utilities are dropped because they failed to submit at least one month of data to the SWRCB.
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Figure 3.3.2: Reductions in Water Production
by the service area population. This approach has been commonly used to measure efficiency
in previous conservation efforts (e.g. CA Water Conservation Act 2009) and is also the basis
for current policies (Quinn, 2012). Based on these R-GPCD ranges, each urban water utility
in the state was assigned a conservation target that ranged between 8% and 36%. These
targets represent conservation objectives defined as percent reduction in water production
relative to 2013 levels and were judged on a cumulative basis from June 2015 through the
end of the mandatory conservation period. Specifically, the SWRCB compared the sum
of monthly water consumption starting June 2015 to the sum of corresponding months of
2013 (SWRCB 2015a). Water utilities that met the adjusted conservation standard were
considered compliant.
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On average, the mean cumulative water production savings over the entire period was
25.9% with a standard deviation of 7.3%.19 All of the water utilities in the sample reported at
least 6.0% savings by the end of the mandatory conservation period, with a maximum savings
of 45.4%. Conservation was not uniformly achieved relative to the assigned conservation
targets. As shown in Table 3.3.2, only 288 utilities (72%) met or were within one percentage
point of their conservation standard (SWRCB, 2016c).
Table 3.3.2: Production Savings Achieved Relative to Conservation Targets (June 2015-May
2016)




Failed to meet conservation standard by
more than 10 percentage points
12 3%
Failed to meet conservation standard by 1 -
10 percentage points
98 25%
Met conservation standard by +/- 1 percent-
age point
34 8%
Exceeded conservation standard by 1 - 10
percentage points
182 46%
Exceeded conservation standard by more
than 10 percentage points
72 18%
Total 398 100%




















As shown in Figure 3.3.3, water utilities with higher conservation targets achieved greater
conservation levels (Panel A) but they were also generally less successful in meeting their
targets than those with lower targets (Panel B).
Figure 3.3.3: Cumulative Savings Relative to Conservation Targets
3.3.1.2 Reported Cases by the General Public
Public awareness campaigns ranged from ads on radio and/or TV, sending out flyers,
hanging up banners, or sending staff to engage with private citizens at farmer’s markets.
Because these public awareness campaigns are likely to have had spillover effects, I identify
each water utility’s primary Neilson district market areas (DMAs) to capture the general effect
of public awareness of campaigns. Each of these areas represents regions in which households
can be expected to have received the same (or similar) media content (e.g. television, radio,
newspaper, internet). I obtain spatial boundary information for DMAs from Gaurav (2016).
As part of these campaigns, customers and the general public were asked to be the
“eyes and ears of the community” by anonymously reporting instances of leaks, sightings of
water running down the street, sprinklers on during the middle of the day, or other potential
instances of “water waste” (e.g. Glendale Water and Power). In addition to a statewide
portal, many water utilities had their own local hotlines and portals. Most of these reported
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instances of water waste were reported to a statewide portal.20 Those reporting instances
of water waste did not need to know the name of the local water utility or how to contact
them. The only information required was the nature of water waste observed, the address at
which it was observed, and had the option of attaching pictures. Water utilities were then
able to search for their service area and then follow up on the complaints. Water utilities
were required to log the number of publicly reported cases in their monthly reports to the
SWRCB, referred to in the dataset as complaints received. I use this information to construct
a measure of relative private citizen involvement in the enforcement process, identifying a
water utility’s service area as being highly involved if the total number of complaints per
capita received over the course of the mandate is above the median, and low otherwise.
3.3.1.3 Water Utility Enforcement
Water utilities reported several metrics related to how intensely they implemented their
policies. First, they reported on the total number of reported cases they followed up on,
referred to in the dataset as follow-ups. The number of follow-ups includes both cases
that were reported by private citizens–complaints received–from hotlines or online portals
and those reported by water utility staff. Water utilities also reported on the number of
warnings issued to violators as well as the number of penalties issued, referred to in the
dataset respectively as warnings and penalties. Water utilities were also required to report
the number of drought-surcharge penalties issued, referred to as rate penalties.
In reading the optional enforcement comments, it is evident that there were several
inconsistencies in how water utilities defined and reported information on warnings, penalties,
20The state portal for reporting instances water waste can be accessed at https://savewater.ca.gov/.
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and rate penalties.21 Namely, several definitions of rate penalties emerged. Some utilities
defined these as surcharges associated with usage in higher tiered rates, hence as temporary
per-unit charges that effectively act as price increases. Others issued rate penalties for
exceeding a usage target or water budget allowance, overlapping in definition with penalties.22
Others noted that they did not “issue fines or penalties in the legal sense of those terms,” but
functionally did the same by charging a drought surcharge. Moreover, there are inconsistencies
in which field this information was recorded in month-to-month; the same water utility would
often switch fields penalties and rate penalties were recorded in. Similarly, some water utilities
defined warnings in ways that overlapped with follow-ups or with penalties.
Given the issues in measuring the number of warnings and penalties, I define effort in
terms of the number of follow-ups. Though Zhang and Teodoro (2018) argue that it reflects
the degree to which water utilities conveyed information about their policies, I argue that
it also reflects the degree to which water utilities exert effort as it is captures instances
in which water utilities actively seek out cases of water waste. Assuming the number of
public complaints is a lower-bound for the number of instances of water waste, water utilities
taking a more passive approach might only rely on public complaints of water waste or might
not follow-up on all the cases that were reported by the public. Water utilities taking a
more active role towards enforcement would theoretically follow-up on more cases than were
reported. I construct a measure of relative effort, identifying a water utility as exerting High
effort if the difference between follow-ups and complaints received is positive and Low effort
21Water utilities often neglected to record information in certain months and provided information
along with subsequent months.
22In an interview, representatives of San Jose Water described their use of rate penalties as not
being “a rate increase, but a penalty program to encourage conservation” (Rogers, 2017).
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Figure 3.3.4: Number of complaints received per capita and the number of cases followed up
by water utilities
otherwise. In Figure 3.3.4, I plot the relationship between complaints received per capita
relative to the number of cases followed up on by water utilities.
3.3.2 Urban Water Supply Plans
I supplement the SWRCB dataset with information from each water utility’s urban water
management plans submitted to California’s Department of Water Resources (CA DWR) in
2015 to capture water utility characteristics that may influence water utilities’ incentive to
pursue conservation. These factors include their primary water source, exposure to severe
drought conditions, and factors associated with taking on political risk. To do so, I first
obtain spatial boundaries for each water utility in the SWRCB dataset by joining them to a
map of all California water utilities obtained from CA DWR.
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3.3.2.1 Residential Gallons Per Capita Per Day
The SWRCB’s assigned conservation targets based on R-GPCD. This assignment rule
assumes that water utilities with similar R-GPCDs are similar. It may be possible, however,
for two water utilities with similar R-GPCD’s to differ in the proportion of water that is used
by their single family customers versus multifamily residential customers. This difference
would impact ability to conserve. In comparing usage characteristics by sector (single family
residential, multi-family residential, commercial, other) for five water utilities subject to EO
B-29-15, Gaur, Smith and Kostiuk (2019) find that usage among single family households
generally reduced while water usage in other sectors (including multifamily residential water
usage) remained generally uniform. I use information from each water utility’s urban water
management plans submitted to the DWR in 2015 to calculate the percentage of residential
water usage that is single family. I also calculate the percentage of water that water utilities
budget for commercial and landscaping purposes.
3.3.2.2 Groundwater Source
Water utilities differ in where they obtain their water sources from. The natural resources
management literature would suggest that water utilities that are more dependent on ground
water sources would have less incentive to conserve (Madani and Dinar, 2012). Groundwater
is cheap to extract. There is very little amount of information on the amount of groundwater
that is available. Additionally, drought plans generally give limited attention to long-term
management of groundwater sources (Langridge et al., 2018). In California, legislation
for groundwater management was signed in 2014. Most of the implementation deadlines,
however, went into effect after EO B-29-15. I obtain information on water utilities’ primary
water source from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Safe Drinking Water Information
System.
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3.3.2.3 Investor-Owned Water Utilities
Lastly, the propensity for local agencies to take on political risk depends on local
sociopolitical context (West, Lee and Feiock, 1992). Notably, the ownership structure of the
water utility may influence its decisions to take on political risk. For instance, investor owned-
utilities may be more sensitive to lost revenue than a public water utility. Investor-owned
water utilities, however, are regulated by California’s Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
and have decoupled rates. This mechanism enables them to recover any forgone revenue due
to conservation. Teodoro, Zhang and Switzer (2018) further argue that regulation via the
CPUC provides a type of political decoupling, insulating investor-owned utilities from some of
the political pressures that public utilities may face as a result of being directly accountable
to voters. Also using data on EO B-29-15, Teodoro, Zhang and Switzer (2018) find evidence
that investor-owned water utilities were more likely to reduce water production more than
public water utilities during the mandate. I identify investor-owned water utilities using a
list of the water utilities regulated by California’s Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
3.3.2.4 Regional Planning
Higher-level governments often encourage horizontal coordination among local agencies
to promote regional collaboration (Burby et al., 1997). Horizontal coordination is meant to
improve resource planning by increasing local capacity and by aligning incentives among
neighboring agencies that share resources. In the context of water management, horizontal
coordination could also be a tool to mitigate over-withdrawing shared water supplies. Though
horizontal coordination was not mandated as part of EO B 29-15, water utilities are encouraged
to collaborate with “other water suppliers that share a common [water] source, water
management agencies, and relevant public agencies, to the extent practicable” (DWR, 2015).
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3.3.3 Drought Conditions
Drought conditions vary by geography. Some water utility service areas may have
experienced severe drought conditions for longer periods of time than other service areas
with the same assigned conservation target. To account for this potential difference, I further
supplement the SWRCB dataset with information on drought conditions using data obtained
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Drought severity is
measured using Palmer Drought Severity Index (PSDI), a measure of relative dryness based
on a physical water-balance model.
3.4 Estimation
I examine the effectiveness of the assigned conservation targets on production savings
using a regression discontinuity design. This approach estimates the effect produced solely by
the assigned target by exploiting discontinuities in cutoffs used to assign treatment.23 A key
feature of regression discontinuity design is the existence of a score that determines treatment
assignment for each unit in the sample given a cutoff score.24 Units with scores above the
cutoff score are considered “treated,” while units whose score is below the cutoff are not. As
discussed in Section 2.1, the SWRCB assigned conservation targets using an assignment rule
based on R-GPCD during the summer of 2014. This rule can be expressed by the following
piecewise function, S(di), where variable di represents water utility i’s GPCD in the summer
of 2014 and ci represents the nearest cutoff:
23Regression discontinuity design was first used Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) as an alternative
method for evaluating social programs. See Jacob et al. (2012) for a review.




8%, 0 < di < 65,
12%, 65 ≤ di < 80,
16%, 80 ≤ di < 95,
20%, 95 ≤ di < 110,
24%, 110 ≤ di < 130,
28%, 130 ≤ di < 170,
32%, 170 ≤ di < 215,
36%, 215 ≤ di
An important feature of the assignment mechanism used by the SWRCB is that it
essentially generates a random assignment of the treatment among utilities around the cutoffs.
From the perspective of the SWRCB, the choice to assign two water utilities with near
identical R-GPCD different conservation targets is arbitrary.
A potential threat to validity would arise if water utilities were able to self-select into
particular cutoffs by manipulating their July-August 2014 R-GPCD. This is unlikely to have
been the case for two inter-related reasons. First, EO-29-15 is the first mandate in California’s
history and its structure is different from mandates used in other states to manage drought.
Therefore, it is unlikely that water utility in 2014 knew that a mandate would be issued in
2015 or how it would be designed. Second, cutoffs based on 2014 R-GPCD were devised
84
after the announcement of the mandate in 2015.25 Water utilities, therefore, could not have
influenced their R-GPCD during July-August 2014 in direct anticipation of the mandate.
Even if water utilities had some influence over the assignment variable, their inability to
precisely manipulate it is sufficient to assume that variation in treatment near the threshold
is random (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
I examine the effect of receiving a higher conservation target using a pooled regression
discontinuity approach, comparing water utilities with a higher target to similar water utilities
that received lower targets. Formally, this implies that the average effect of treatment does
not vary with the running variable. Treatment status can formally be defined as
τ̂ = lim
x↓0
E[Yi|xi = ξ]− lim
x↑0
E[Yi|xi = ξ]
where τ̂ , represents a “weighted average across cutoffs of the local average treatment effects
across all units facing each particular cutoff value” (Bertanha, 2019).
I estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) for this sharp discontinuity using
ordinary least squares (OLS), given by (3.2):
Yi = Diτ̂ + βXi + εi, (3.2)
where Di denotes treatment status. Following Calonico et al. (2019), I include additional
covariates, represented by Xi, to account for differences among utilities with similar GPCDs
25Following the proclamation of EO-29-15 in April, 2015, there were several weeks of public comments.
These comments were used by the SWRCB in formulating the regulations that were officially
adopted at the SWRCB’s May 5th meeting.
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using a simple covariate-adjusted estimator.26 First, I control for cumulative percent reduction
that water utilities achieved in the year prior to the mandate to account for the possibility that
past ability to conserve may be a predictor of future conservation results. A concern among
utilities is that past efforts to achieve conservation make it harder to achieve conservation
in the future (referred to in the literature as demand hardening). Second, I control for the
number of months that a water utility received warnings from the SWRCB for falling behind
their objective. Third, I control for water utility characteristics, including the percentage
of residential water usage that is single family, an indicator variable for whether or not the
utility is regulated by public utility commission, and an indicator variable to indicate if
groundwater is the primary source of water. Following the SWRCB’s methodology, I identify
the months in which water utilities received warnings from the SWRCB and control for the
number of letters water utilities received. Lastly, I include fixed effects for district market
areas to control for media-related spillover effects that would have affected awareness levels
across service areas.
I start by estimating (3.2) using the percentage cumulative water production savings
achieved by utilities during the mandatory conservation period relative to their 2013 pro-
duction levels as the outcome of interest, Yi. I provide estimates of (3.2) for key coefficients
in Table 3.4.3. I provide results for several different distance bandwidths to serve as a
sensitivity check; narrowing the bandwidth ensures increased similarly in terms of R-GPCD
at the expense of fewer observations. Starting with the estimated coefficients for the effect of
receiving a higher conservation target, the results show that the differential incentives pro-
vided by the mandate likely had little effect. The coefficients are generally small, statistically
26This estimate is consistent under the assumption that the treatment has no mean effect on the
covariates at the cutoffs.
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insignificant, and negative for most specifications, meaning that water utilities with higher
conservation targets generally did not save more as their counterparts with lower targets.
Turning to the effects of water utility effort and public involvement in enforcement, the
results suggest that the effect of public involvement was significant. All else equal, water
utilities with high effort and high complaints received conserved at least 2.1% more than
water utilities with low effort and low complaints. Water utilities with high effort and low
complaints conserved at least 1.7% less than water utilities with low effort and low complaints.
I re-estimate (3.2) using the difference between the cumulative savings achieved during
the mandate relative to the assigned conservation target as the dependent variable. Positive
differences indicate water production savings that exceed assigned conservation targets whereas
negative differences indicate water production savings less than assigned conservation targets.
Consistent with Figure 3.3.3, the results in Table 3.4.4 indicate that higher conservation
targets were less able to meet their assigned conservation target. The results are negative,
albeit statistically insignificant.
With respect to water utility effort and public involvement in enforcement, higher levels
of citizen involvement in enforcement has a statistically significant effect on water utilities’
ability to meet their target. As shown in Table 3.4.4, water utilities that exerted high
effort and had a high amount of reported instances of “water waste” met their target by
approximately 2% more than water utilities exerting low effort and low amounts of reported
instances of “water waste.” Water utilities with high effort but low reported instances of
“water waste” were not statistically different from water utilities with low effort and low
reported instances of “water waste.”
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3.5 Conclusion
The trend of higher-level government institutions using mandates as emergency measures
as means of imposing safeguards and mitigating the consequences of droughts can be expected
to continue. It is therefore important to draw lessons from previous experiences to inform
future policy. In this paper, I use data on California water utilities subjected to a year-long
conservation mandate. I exploit the mandate’s multi-tier approach to assigning conservation
targets to estimate the extent to which water utilities conserved water due to the mandate
itself.
I find that mandates don’t necessarily solve the principal-agent problem that state
regulators often face. My results indicate that water utilities did not strongly respond to
the incentive to conserve generated by the assigned cutoffs. Part of this can be explained by
the two-part nature of the problem. Throughout the drought, media campaigns were used
to encourage private citizens to anonymously identify and complain about other users that
used water in ways deemed “wasteful.” Notably the results of this study also suggest that
private citizen activism appears to be an overlooked aspect of local agency compliance. Water
utilities with customers that actively complained about “water waste” were not only able to
conserve more but also more easily meet their assigned target. Furthermore, aggressive effort
in the absence of public support may not yield desired objectives. Notably, water utilities
exerting high effort but low reported instances of “water waste” were not statistically different
from water utilities exerting low effort and low reported instances of “water waste.”
This study also highlights the need for improving reporting standards. The data reporting
requirements of the SWRCB are laudable in that it improves transparency of information.
Yet, there were substantial inconsistencies regarding how water utilities reported data on
warnings, penalties, and rate penalties that likely stemmed from confusion over definitions.
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Table 3.4.3: Results for Cumulative Production Savings
Bandwidth
VARIABLES Distance<4 Distance<5 Distance<6 Distance<7
Higher conservation target 1.108 1.113 -0.385 -0.465
(1.780) (1.510) (1.513) (1.397)
Distance from target -0.433 -0.447* -0.0140 -0.0133
(0.383) (0.252) (0.220) (0.178)
High complaints, low effort 3.284** 2.282** 2.035* 1.953*
(1.417) (1.147) (1.165) (1.113)
Low complaints, high effort -0.935 -0.429 -0.462 -0.511
(1.123) (1.012) (0.979) (0.925)
High complaints, high effort 3.395*** 3.582*** 3.390*** 3.190***
(1.228) (1.119) (1.100) (1.056)
Number of SWRCB letters received -0.215** -0.194** -0.190* -0.153*
(0.107) (0.0964) (0.0969) (0.0910)
Number of months in severe drought 0.0748 0.0392 0.162 0.181
(0.161) (0.123) (0.127) (0.126)
Regulated by CPUC 3.935** 2.869** 1.899 1.585
(1.557) (1.239) (1.231) (1.188)
Percent commercial 1.671 1.972 0.446 0.230
(1.746) (1.607) (1.626) (1.631)
Primarily supplied by groundwater -1.103 -1.264 0.156 0.180
(1.147) (0.980) (0.953) (0.898)
Landscape -0.519 -0.152 0.442 -0.0331
(1.060) (0.966) (0.922) (0.825)
Regional urban management plan -0.0612 -0.0423 -0.0388 -0.0297
(0.0616) (0.0476) (0.0400) (0.0393)
Percent residential single family 7.368** 7.304** 9.144*** 9.365***
(3.378) (2.931) (2.801) (2.635)
Cumulative savings year prior 0.441*** 0.479*** 0.548*** 0.584***
(0.0941) (0.0822) (0.0802) (0.0784)
Constant 11.55*** 11.14*** 8.398*** 8.189***
(3.855) (3.211) (3.119) (2.853)
Observations 111 145 169 192
R2 0.666 0.665 0.616 0.624
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4.4: Results for Production Savings Relative to Assigned Conservation Target
Bandwidth
VARIABLES Distance<4 Distance<5 Distance<6 Distance<7
Higher conservation target -0.281 -0.278 -0.968 -1.066
(1.812) (1.561) (1.479) (1.383)
Distance from target -0.345 -0.294 -0.119 -0.0673
(0.390) (0.260) (0.215) (0.176)
High complaints, low effort 2.053 2.701** 1.901* 1.398
(1.442) (1.186) (1.139) (1.102)
Low complaints, high effort 0.963 1.431 1.293 1.208
(1.143) (1.047) (0.957) (0.916)
High complaints, high effort 3.560*** 2.941** 2.774** 1.791*
(1.249) (1.157) (1.075) (1.046)
Number of SWRCB letters received -0.840*** -0.806*** -0.812*** -0.845***
(0.109) (0.0997) (0.0947) (0.0901)
Number of months in severe drought 0.0429 0.0324 0.104 0.0818
(0.164) (0.127) (0.124) (0.124)
Regulated by CPUC 3.030* 1.849 1.219 0.906
(1.584) (1.281) (1.203) (1.176)
Percent commercial -2.835 -3.234* -4.282*** -3.891**
(1.776) (1.662) (1.589) (1.615)
Primarily supplied by groundwater -0.820 -1.333 -0.232 -0.0256
(1.167) (1.013) (0.931) (0.889)
Landscape -0.211 -0.433 -0.0703 0.168
(1.078) (0.999) (0.901) (0.817)
Regional urban management plan -0.0562 -0.0795 -0.0330 -0.0357
(0.0627) (0.0492) (0.0391) (0.0389)
Percent residential single family -4.750 -3.021 -2.868 -2.443
(3.437) (3.030) (2.738) (2.609)
Cumulative savings year prior 0.202** 0.266*** 0.344*** 0.353***
(0.0958) (0.0850) (0.0783) (0.0776)
Constant 7.810** 6.379* 4.613 4.801*
(3.923) (3.320) (3.048) (2.825)
Observations 111 145 169 192
R2 0.731 0.708 0.674 0.666
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1.1 Innovation Results
The results from estimating (1.7) are in Appendix Table 1.1.1:
Appendix Table 1.1.1: Main Results
Water-Related Technologies
All Conservation Supply Quality
Cluster in MSA 49.969∗∗∗ 37.762∗∗∗ 6.474∗∗∗ 10.114∗∗∗
(13.913) (11.871) (1.412) (1.875)
Cluster within 50mi 21.537∗∗∗ 17.092∗∗∗ 1.916∗∗∗ 3.756∗∗∗
(3.581) (3.256) (0.245) (0.353)
Cluster within 100mi −1.900 −0.509 −0.617∗∗∗ −1.092∗∗∗
(1.440) (1.301) (0.123) (0.190)
Cluster within 150mi 0.273 −0.040 0.041 0.275
(1.465) (1.344) (0.124) (0.182)
Cluster within 200mi −11.337∗∗∗ −9.511∗∗∗ −0.609∗∗∗ −1.583∗∗∗
(1.845) (1.697) (0.123) (0.187)
Carcinogens (lbs) 1.065∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.077) (0.011) (0.017)
Patenting activity in MSA 29.076∗∗∗ 26.783∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 1.766∗∗∗
(5.368) (4.950) (0.266) (0.371)
Water patenting foreign 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.00005) (0.0001)
Control fun −15.583∗∗∗ −13.870∗∗∗ −0.396∗ −1.714∗∗∗
(3.814) (3.609) (0.221) (0.382)
CEE 14.157∗∗∗ 9.681∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ 3.709∗∗∗
(4.767) (4.455) (0.325) (0.511)
MSA-EPA dist −0.00001∗∗ −0.00001∗ −0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Northest −4.527∗∗ −3.978∗∗ −0.345∗∗ −0.486∗∗
(2.153) (1.962) (0.145) (0.244)
Midwest 7.718∗ 5.803 0.767∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗
(4.056) (3.640) (0.301) (0.418)
South −6.862∗∗∗ −5.999∗∗∗ −0.410∗∗∗ −0.721∗∗∗
(1.650) (1.442) (0.137) (0.225)
Constant 33.239∗∗∗ 29.438∗∗∗ 0.223 4.128∗∗∗
(9.515) (8.948) (0.608) (1.053)
Note: Effect of water technology cluster is allowed to vary by distance. Time means of the
instruments omitted. HAC standard errors are reported.
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As a robustness check, I also estimate a version of (1.7) restricting the effect of technology
clusters to the MSA in which they are located. These results are in Appendix Table 1.1.2:
Appendix Table 1.1.2: Main Results without spillover effects
Water-Related Technologies
All Conservation Supply Quality
Cluster in MSA 53.739∗∗∗ 40.851∗∗∗ 6.664∗∗∗ 10.698∗∗∗
(14.235) (12.141) (1.437) (1.911)
Carcinogens (lbs) 1.083∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.080) (0.011) (0.017)
Patenting activity in MSA 29.923∗∗∗ 27.449∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗
(5.549) (5.106) (0.275) (0.388)
Water patenting foreign 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Control fun −16.972∗∗∗ −14.985∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗ −1.944∗∗∗
(3.778) (3.579) (0.218) (0.383)
CEE 14.678∗∗∗ 10.205∗∗ 2.159∗∗∗ 3.716∗∗∗
(4.830) (4.498) (0.330) (0.526)
MSA-EPA dist −0.00001 −0.00000 −0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00000∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Northest −3.351 −3.002 −0.278∗ −0.312
(2.119) (1.927) (0.145) (0.247)
Midwest 4.609 3.216 0.568∗ 1.059∗∗
(4.213) (3.786) (0.301) (0.425)
South −6.731∗∗∗ −6.003∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.617∗∗∗
(1.591) (1.402) (0.130) (0.208)
Constant 30.382∗∗∗ 27.121∗∗∗ 0.033 3.694∗∗∗
(9.564) (8.983) (0.603) (1.051)
Note: Effect of water technology cluster limited to the MSA in which it is located. Time means of
the instruments omitted. HAC standard errors are reported.
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Appendix 1.2 Control Function Exclusion Restrictions
In this section, I discuss the choice of exclusion restrictions used in the selection equation and
the rationale behind the identification assumption (i.e., why the variables impact selection
but not the main equation of interest).
Distance to the nearest regional EPA Office
Water technology clusters that are part of the Water Technology Cluster Initiative
acquire recognition from the EPA. Consistent with the regional economic framework adopted
in this paper, I posit that proximity to a regional EPA office would presumably be correlated
with the location of a water technology cluster. Moreover, proximity to a regional EPA office
would only be associated with water-related patenting activity through it’s association with
water technology clusters.
Presence of a Civil and Environmental Engineering Department
Universities are a key industry-related institution in the innovative process, creating,
diffusin, and deploying new knowledge in economically useful ways (Feldman et al., 2002).
The location of universities Civil Engineering programs is used as a proxy for universities that
focus on water-related issues. A list of these universities, provided in Appendix Appendix
1.5, is obtained from Shanghai Ranking and geocoded. Of the 200 universities listed, 48 were
in the United States.
Drought history
Water technology clusters may differ in the nature of the technologies they work on,
depending on the region’s particular needs and strengths. I control for the propensity to work
on water scarcity issues by controlling for each location’s propensity to experience drought
using the total number of drought episodes from 1930 through time t− 1.
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Expenditure on water and sewer infrastructure
Water innovators are interested in key aspects of water utility operations, most notably
water treatment. For instance, water treatment is energy intensive. Additionally, waste-water
contains valuable materials that can be extracted and re-purposed (Monteith et al., 2008).
Water utilities in their capacity to finance (construct, maintain, operate) facilities necessary
for those purposes due to limited resources. I proxy for water utility’s capacity to collaborate
using MSA-level on expenditures for facility operation, maintenance, and construction.
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Appendix 1.3 Patent Codes
In this section, I provide the lists of IPC and CPC codes for water-related technologies
in Appendix Table 1.3.1, Appendix Table 1.3.2, and Appendix Table 1.3.3 from Haščič and
Migotto (2015). I supplement this list for desalination technologies using codes identified by
van der Vegt et al. (2011). The main advantage of using these codes to identify particular types
of innovations is that they are heavily reliant on the detailed knowledge of patent examiners
(Haščič and Migotto, 2015; van der Vegt et al., 2011). Furthermore, this approach is useful as
it captures many of the recent water-related technologies that have been driven by advances
in digital technologies that has cross-over applications in the water sector. Alternative
approaches to identifying patents involves the use of keywords (e.g. Ajami, Thompson and
Victor, 2014). Using keywords, however, can be a costly strategy as the search outcome will
be highly sensitive to the set of keywords used. This method would likely underestimate of
innovation in the water sector.
Appendix Table 1.3.1: IPC and CPC Codes for Technologies Aimed at Water Pollution
Abatement
Category IPC Codes Description
Water and Waste
Water Treatment
B63J4 Arrangements of installations for treating water
or sewage
C02F Treatment of water, waste water, sewage, or
sludge
C09K3/32 Methods for treating liquid pollutants




C05F 7/00 Fertilizers from water, sewage sludge, sea slime,
ooze or similar masses
Oil Spill Cleanup
Related
E02B15/04-10 Devices for cleaning the surface of open water
from oil or like floating materials by separating
or removing these materials
B63B35/32 Vessels adapted for collecting pollution from
open water
C09K 3/32 Materials for treating liquid pollutants, e.g. oil,
gasoline, or fat
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Appendix Table 1.3.2: IPC and CPC Codes for Technologies Aimed at Water Supply
Augmentation
Category IPC Codes Description
Water Collection
E03B 5 Use of pumping plants
E03B 3/06-26 Ways to collect drinking water or tap water
from underground
E03B 9 Methods for drawing off water
E03B 3/04, 28-38 Ways to collect drinking water or tap water
from surface water
E03B 3/03 Ways to collect drinking water or tap water
from rainwater




Ways to collect drinking water or tap water
from surface water, underground, or rainwater
Water Storage
E03B 11 Arrangements or adaptations of tanks for water
supply
Desalination
B01D Physical or chemical processes or apparatus in
general: separation
F24J Production or use of heat not otherwise pro-
vided
F03G Spring, weight, inertia, or like motors;
mechanical-power-producing devices or mech-
anisms, not otherwise provided for or using
energy sources not otherwise provided for
F01K Steam engine plants; steam accumulators; en-
gine plants not otherwise provided for; engines
using special working fluids or cycles
H01L Semiconductor devices; electric solid-state de-
vices not otherwise provided for
A01G Horticulture; cultivation of vegetables, flowers,
rice, fruit, vines, hops, or seaweed; forestry;
watering
F03D Wind motors
F04B Positive displacement machines for liquid
pumps
F03B Machines or engines for liquids
B63B Ships or other waterborne vessels; equipment
for shipping
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F16K21/06-12 Self-closing valves, i.e. closing automatically
after operation, either retarded or immediately
after opening
F16K 21/16-20 Self-closing valves, i.e. closing automatically
after operation, closing after a predetermined
quantity of fluid has been delivered
F16L 55/07 Arrangement or mounting of devices, e.g.
valves for venting or aerating or draining
E03C 1/084 Jet regulators with aerating means
E03D 3/12 Flushing devices discharging variable quantities
of water
E03D 1/14 Cisterns discharging variable quantities of wa-
ter
A47K 11/12 Urinals without flushing
A47K 11/02 Dry closets
E03D13/007 Waterless or low-flush urinals
E03D5/016 Special constructions of flushing devices with
recirculation of bowl-cleaning fluid
E03B1/041 Greywater supply systems
Y02B 40/46 Optimization of water quantity (for dishwash-
ers)
Y02B 40/56 Optimization of water quantity (for washing
machines)
Continued on next page
97
Appendix Table 1.3.3 – Continued from previous page
Category Codes Description
Irrigation
A01G 25/02 Watering arrangements located above the soil
which makes use of perforated pipe-lines or
pip-lines with dispensing fittings, e.g. for drip
irrigation
A01G 25/06 Watering arrangements making use of perfo-
rated pipe-lines located in the soil
A01G 25/16 Control of watering
C12N15/8273 Mutation or genetic engineering: DNA or RNA,
concerning genetic engineering, vectors, e.g.
plasmids, or their isolation, preparation or pu-
rification for drought, cold, salt resistance
Power
Production
F01K 23/08-10 Combustion heat from one cycle heating the
fluid in another
F01D 11 Non-positive displacement machines or engines,
e.g. steam turbines/Preventing or minimizing
internal leakage of working fluid
Water
Distribution
F17D5/02 & E03 Pipe-line systems/Preventing, monitoring, or
locating loss





Investigating fluid tightness of structures, by
detecting the presence of fluid at leaking point
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Appendix 1.4 Water Technology Clusters Locations and Estab-
lishment Dates
Appendix Table 1.4.1: Water Technology Clusters Supported by Water Technology Cluster
Initiative




Current Chicago, IL 2016 Technology testing
Michigan Water Technology
Initiative
Lansing, MI 2009 Technology testing
Cleveland Water Alliance Cleveland, OH 2014 Technology testing
Confluence Water Technology
Innovation Cluster
Cincinnati, OH 2010 Treatment
Akron Global Water Alliance Akron, OH 2014 Treatment




Boston, MA 2011 Technology testing
Water Technology Innovation
Ecosystem
Philadelphia, PA 2011 Treatment
SOUTH
Accelerate H20 San Antonio, TX 2010 Water and energy
H2OTECH Atlanta, GA 2015 Human health
WEST
University of Arizona Water &
Energy Sustainable Technology
Center
Tucson, AZ 2013 Technology testing
Maritime Alliance* San Diego, CA 2007 Maritime technology
Los Angeles Cleantech Incubator Burbank, CA 2011
BlueTech Valley Fresno, CA 2011 Commercialization services,
technology testing
Colorado Water Innovation Cluster Fort Collins, CO 2010 Agriculture, efficiency,
water filtration
WaterStart Las Vegas, NV 2012 Conservation, storage,
treatment
Oregon Water Tech Innovators Portland, OR 2014 Storage, treatment,
stormwater management
PureBlue Seattle, WA 2016
Source: Water Environment Federation (n.d.). Maritime Alliance was formerly known as TMA
BlueTech.
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NorTech Cleveland, OH 2011 Technology testing
Louisiana Water Network 2015




Pittsburg, PA 2012 Industrial Water Retention
and Storage, Water Reuse
and Treatment
Surge Accelator* Houston, TX 2011 Energy efficiency, oil and
gas
Urban Clean Water Technology
Zone
Tacoma, WA 2014 Stormwater treatment
Notes: These technologies clusters are discussed in Picou (2014). Of these, Surge Accelator filed for
bankruptcy in 2016.
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Appendix 1.5 Engineering Departments with a Water Specializa-
tion
Appendix Table 1.5.1: List of US Universities with Environmental Engineering Department
with a Water Specialization
Texas A&M University University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
University of California, Davis Columbia University
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Georgia Institute of Technology
University of California, Berkeley North Carolina State University - Raleigh
Colorado School of Mines Portland State University
Stanford University University of California, Riverside
University of Colorado at Boulder University of Iowa
Oregon State University Yale University
University of California, Irvine Florida International University
Pennsylvania State University - University Park Johns Hopkins University
Colorado State University University of Connecticut
Duke University University of Massachusetts Amherst
California Institute of Technology University of Michigan-Ann Arbor
Cornell University University of Nevada-Las Vegas
Princeton University University of Utah
University of Florida University of California, Los Angeles
University of Washington University of California, Santa Barbara
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University
Arizona State University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) The Ohio State University - Columbus
Michigan State University Utah State University
Purdue University - West Lafayette University of Idaho
University of Maryland, College Park University of Oklahoma - Norman
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities University of Arizona
University of Nebraska - Lincoln The University of Texas at Austin
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Appendix 1.6 Robustness Check: Effect of Water Technology
Clusters on Innovative Activity
In this section, I use a Bayesian Structural Time-Series (BSTS) approach is used as an
alternative method to quantify the causal impact of water technology clusters on patenting
activity (a robustness check on the estimates presented in Section 1.4). The BSTS approach
consists of constructing counterfactuals, referred to as synthetic controls, to represent the
scenario where no technology cluster was established. The synthetic control is constructed
using using a matching algorithm that identifies a pool of MSAs without clusters with similar
patenting trends to MSAs that establish clusters prior to treatment. The difference between
post-treatment predictions for the synthetic control and the observed outcomes observed for
the treated MSAs is considered the impact of establishing a water technology cluster.
The BSTS approach is implemented in three steps (Brodersen et al., 2015; Schmitt et al.,
2018).27 First, Each MSA i ∈ 1, ..., N with a water technology cluster is matched with a set
of control MSA’s Ck = ck, k ∈ 1, ..., K that does not have a cluster. The set of control MSAs
are chosen based on the similarities in patenting activity prior to the establishment of the
water technology cluster. In the second step, predicted levels of innovation for the synthetic
control are subtracted from the observed levels of innovation in the treated MSAs to obtain
a measure of increased patenting levels due to the water technology cluster for each treated
MSA i in each post-intervention year, s.
27The methodology was developed to assess the the impact of marketing campaigns. The
BSTS methodology was implemented using the R package CausalImpact provided by
Google (Brodersen et al., 2015) via the MarketMatching wrapper written to simplify im-





is = yis − ỹ
(τ)
is (Appendix 1.6.1)
The cumulative impact of water technology clusters in each treated MSA i is then calculated



















As in Section 3.4, the impact of water technology clusters is estimated using a 0mi, 50mi
and 100mi radii. Results for the average effect of water technology clusters on patenting
activity, φ̄(τ), by technology type are provided in Appendix Figure 1.6.1- Appendix Figure
1.6.3. In Appendix Figure 1.6.1, the effect of water technology clusters is limited to the
MSA in which it is located. The results indicate that the establishment of water technology
clusters, on average, has no effect on patenting activity.
In Appendix Figure 1.6.2, the effect of water technology clusters is extended to MSAs
within a 50mi radius of a water technology cluster. The results indicate that the establishment
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Appendix Figure 1.6.1: Impact of Water Technology Clusters on Patenting Activity
Note: The boxplot shows the average effect of water technology clusters on patenting activity by
technology type. Effect of technology cluster limited to the MSA in which it is located.
of water technology clusters, on average, increases patenting activity for technologies that
augment water supply and those that abate water pollution.
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Appendix Figure 1.6.2: Impact of Water Technology Clusters on Patenting Activity: 50mi
radius
Note: The boxplot shows the average effect of water technology clusters on patenting activity by
technology type. Effect of technology cluster extented to MSAs within a 50mi radius. The
algorithm could not find adequate matches for three MSAs.
Appendix Figure 1.6.3: Impact of Water Technology Clusters on Patenting Activity: 100mi
radius
Note: The boxplot shows the average effect of water technology clusters on patenting activity by
technology type. Effect of technology cluster extented to MSAs within a 100mi radius. The
algorithm could not find adequate matches for three MSAs.
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Appendix 2.1 Deriving the Water Stress Index
Previous studies of water demand have taken a variety of approaches in modeling relevant
environmental factors. The most common controls used are measures of precipitation (Moncur,
1987; Renwick and Archibald, 1998; Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges, 2004; Roseta-Palma
et al., 2013) or a combination of precipitation and temperature measures (Lyman, 1992;
Agthe and Billings, 1997; Pint, 1999; Martínez-Espiñeira, 2003; Taylor, McKean and Young,
2004; Gaudin, 2006; Wichman, 2017). Some studies have instead relied on measures of
evapotranspiration (Billings and Agthe, 1980; Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1988; Hewitt and
Hanemann, 1995; Dandy, Nguyen and Davies, 1997; Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins,
2005). Many additional measures – such as wind speed, minutes of sunshine, and temperature
differences relative to some threshold – have also been used.28 Some recent demand estimation
studies in western states have made use of satellite imagery data to calculate a Normalized
Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), a measure of landscape “greenness” to represent demand
(Wentz and Gober, 2007; Balling, Gober and Jones, 2008; Harlan et al., 2009; Halper et al.,
2015; Wolak, 2016; Clarke, Colby and Thompson, 2017; Brent, 2016).
In contrast to these approaches, we create a water stress index using the RHESSys
model.29 The advantage of this model is that it uses elements of ecosystem models (e.g.
BIOME-BGC (Running and Hunt Jr, 1993) and CENTURY (Parton et al., 1987)) to model
28Though typically weather variables are included as linear terms, Maidment and Miaou (1986) argue
that the effects of weather may be nonlinear, as the effects of rainfall, for example, diminish over
time. Martínez-Espiñeira (2002) argues that the number of rainy days can have a psychological
impact therefore can have a greater impact on water demand.
29RHESSys has been widely used to model spatially distributed soil moisture, evapotranspiration,
surface and subsurface runoff, carbon and nitrogen cycling in different biomes and under different
climate and land use change scenarios (Band et al., 1993; Bart, Tague and Moritz, 2016; Gao
et al., 2018; Garcia, Tague and Choate, 2016; Hanan, Tague and Schimel, 2017; Hwang, Band and
Hales, 2009; Lin, 2013; Lin et al., 2015, 2019; Miles and Band, 2015).
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spatial and temporal dynamics of soil moisture available to lawns (the top 20 cm of soil). To do
this, we first provide the RHESSys model with highly detailed spatial information to partition
the landscape into forest, roads, rooftops, impervious surfaces, wetlands, pasture/agriculture
lands, and lawns.30 We then model surface and subsurface water flowpaths over the watershed.
Outputs of RHESSys relevant to this study includes catchment-scaled streamflow, patch-scaled
(30 m) soil moisture, and patch-scaled vegetation water demand and evapotranspiration.
Using data from USGS gauges in the OWASA service area, we calibrate parameters
related to hydrologic conductivity (water transport rate in soil columns) in our model using
information for 2000-2004 and validate the model using information for 2007-2009.31 We con-
duct Monte Carlo simulations to generate five-thousand predictions of streamflow/catchment
runoff using these parameters. These predictions are then compared to the observed stream-
flow in order to find the set of conductivity parameters that best represents the area under
study. Model fit is evaluated using the weekly Nash–Sutcliffe model efficiency coefficient
(NSE), both logged and in levels.32 We rank all simulations by their NSE coefficients and
select the top-two-hundred for our study. For each of these simulations, we summarize model
outputs as an index, given by WSr = 1− ξa/ξp, that captures the lack of moisture available
to lawns. In this equation, ξa represents actual evapotranspiration and ξp represents potential
30We use land use landcover information at a resolution of 1 meter from the Environmental Protection
Agency’s EnviroAtlas (Pickard et al., 2015).
31We calibrate the model using low streamflow conditions due to drought conditions during 2001-02
and high streamflow that resulted from the extreme wet event in the latter part of 2002. Other
time periods provide information on “normal" streamflow conditions. We validate the hydrological
model using 2007-2009, a time period in which another drought occurred.
32Comparisons of predicted to observed streamflow require consideration of how predictions perform
under various flow events (high vs. low). The NSE coefficient in levels provides information on
model fitness for high flow events whereas the log transformed NSE coefficient provides information
on model fitness for low flow events. High weekly and log-weekly NSE values are desired.
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Appendix Figure 2.1.1: Water Stress During the 2002 Drought
evapotranspiration. We create two versions of the variable at different spatial scales: a Census
Block Group specific measure (used in the main analysis) and another at the watershed level.
Appendix Figure 2.1.1 graphically represents the spatial and temporal variation in the water
stress index in the study area during the onset of the 2002 drought.
108
Appendix 2.2 Demand Estimation Results
Main Specification
The results from estimating (2.1) are in Appendix Table 2.2.1.




High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0629 -0.0455 -0.0816 -0.0666 -0.1037 -0.134
(0.0238) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.0161) (0.0233) (0.0375)
Stage 1 0.000400 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0028 -0.004 -0.0056
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0038 -0.004 -0.0051
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Emergency -0.0057 -0.0071 -0.0114 -0.0106 -0.0199 -0.0119
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Water stress 0.0491 0.0327 0.0673 0.0467 0.0851 0.0477
(0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.003) (0.0053)
Temperature 0.0134 0.0102 0.0461 0.0233 0.121 0.0436
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.003) (0.0045) (0.0072)
Year trend -0.0416 -0.0168 -0.03 -0.0284 -0.0197 -0.0149
(0.0037) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0064)
Cons. req. -0.1488 -0.0373 -0.1706 -0.1347 -0.2257 -0.0867
(0.026) (0.0181) (0.0152) (0.0188) (0.025) (0.0441)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0441 0.00480 0.0245 0.0111 0.00580 -0.0265
(0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0099)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Ignoring Heterogeneous Impact of Environmental Factors
If we do not allow the impact of environmental factors to vary by wealth and usage
profiles, we may fail to capture cross-household preference differences for outdoor water usage.
This yields very different conclusions regarding price sensitivity. To see this, we run a series
of alternative specifications that reduce heterogeneity in various ways. First, we estimate

















τuZitθu + ηi + εit. (Appendix 2.2.1)
The results from estimating (Appendix 2.2.1) are in Appendix Table 2.2.2. Comparing the
results to Appendix Table 2.2.1, elasticity estimates for high-wealth household are smaller,
while those for low-wealth households are larger. The effect is particularly strong among
households with Moderate and Heavy usage profiles.
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Appendix Table 2.2.2: Main results allowing environmental controls to vary by usage profile




High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0439 -0.0541 -0.055 -0.1071 -0.0573 -0.2708
(0.0227) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.0153) (0.0229) (0.0354)
Stage 1 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.0046 -0.0036
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0047 -0.0032
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Emergency -0.0061 -0.0068 -0.0115 -0.0104 -0.0198 -0.012
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Water stress* 0.0677 0.0402 0.0677 0.0402 0.0677 0.0402
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Temperature* 0.0550 0.0184 0.0550 0.0184 0.0550 0.0184
(0.0021) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002)
Year trend -0.0376 -0.019 -0.0277 -0.0325 -0.0177 -0.0226
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0061)
Cons. req. -0.1604 -0.0311 -0.1753 -0.1244 -0.2267 -0.0732
(0.0258) (0.018) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.025) (0.0435)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0427 0.00550 0.0229 0.0131 0.00350 -0.0203
(0.0058) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0099)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Second, we estimate a model in which the impact of environmental factors varies by
















τwZitθw + ηi + εit. (Appendix 2.2.2)
The results from estimating (Appendix 2.2.2) are in Appendix Table 2.2.3. Compared
to Appendix Table 2.2.2, elasticity estimates for high wealth household are smaller while
those for low-wealth households are larger among households with Heavy usage profiles. Note
that this results in positive elasticity estimates for high wealth households with Heavy usage
profiles.
Appendix Table 2.2.3: Main results allowing environmental controls to vary by wealth but




High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.1615 -0.07 -0.0968 -0.0496 0.0292 -0.0801
(0.0226) (0.0143) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0221) (0.0349)
Stage 1 0.00170 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0032 -0.0054 -0.0062
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Stage 2 0.000500 -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0043 -0.0054 -0.0055
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Emergency -0.006 -0.0069 -0.0116 -0.0107 -0.019 -0.0116
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Water stress* 0.0677 0.0402 0.0677 0.0402 0.0677 0.0402
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Temperature* 0.0550 0.0184 0.0550 0.0184 0.0550 0.0184
(0.0021) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002)
Year trend -0.046 -0.0191 -0.0297 -0.0263 -0.0167 -0.0138
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.006)
Cons. req. -0.146 -0.0321 -0.1741 -0.1409 -0.2188 -0.0852
(0.0258) (0.018) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0248) (0.0434)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0491 0.00620 0.0252 0.0102 -0.0006 -0.0288
(0.0058) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0099)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Next, we estimate a model in which the impact of environmental factors is not allowed













τuwXitφuwk + τuZitθ + ηi + εit. (Appendix 2.2.3)
The results from estimating (Appendix 2.2.3) are in Appendix Table 2.2.4. Compared
to Appendix Table 2.2.2, elasticity estimates for high-wealth household are smaller while
those for low-wealth households are larger for households with Moderate and Heavy usage
profiles. We obtain positive elasticity estimates for high wealth households with Heavy usage
profiles. Elasticity estimates under this specification are larger for both high- and low-wealth
households with Light usage profiles.





High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.1128 -0.123 -0.05 -0.1028 0.0764 -0.132
(0.0224) (0.014) (0.0132) (0.0151) (0.022) (0.0348)
Stage 1 0.000900 0.000300 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0061 -0.0052
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Stage 2 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0064 -0.0045
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Emergency -0.0061 -0.0067 -0.0117 -0.0106 -0.019 -0.0114
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Water stress* 0.0677 0.0402 0.0677 0.0402 0.0677 0.0402
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Temperature* 0.0550 0.0184 0.0550 0.0184 0.0550 0.0184
(0.0021) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002)
Year trend -0.0427 -0.0238 -0.0263 -0.0309 -0.0131 -0.0188
(0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.006)
Cons. req. -0.1518 -0.0223 -0.1798 -0.1299 -0.226 -0.0728
(0.0257) (0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0248) (0.0434)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0465 0.00910 0.0225 0.0128 -0.0031 -0.0262
(0.0058) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0099)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Finally, we analyze a model without any heterogeneous effects:
qit = βjpt +
∑
k
Xitφkj + Zitθj + ηi + εit. (Appendix 2.2.4)
The results from estimating (Appendix 2.2.4) are in Appendix Table 2.2.5.


















Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0331
(.0001)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix 2.3 Command-and-Control (CAC) Restrictions
Appendix Figure 2.3.1: Timeline of CAC Restriction Implementation
Definitions of stage restrictions provided in April 2002
• Stage 1: Irrigation of lawns, gardens, trees, or shrubs with OWASA-supplied potable
water applied through any system or device other than a hand-held hose or watering
can shall be allowed only three days out of each week.
• Stage 2: Irrigation of lawns, gardens, trees, or shrubs with OWASA-supplied potable
water applied through any system or device other than a hand-held hose or watering
can shall be allowed only one day out of each week.
• Water Supply Emergency: No OWASA-supplied potable water for any outdoor
purposes other than emergency fire suppression or other activities necessary to maintain
public health, safety, or welfare.
Modifications of CAC policies in June 2003
• Year-Round Conservation Requirement: Spray irrigation limited to 3 days/week.
Use of reclaimed or harvested water strongly encouraged. Use of water saving fixtures
strongly encouraged.
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Appendix 2.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Usage Profile Assignment
In the main paper, we defined households in terms of their usage profile observed during
the year prior to treatment, October 2000-September 2001. Here we consider an alternative
specification in which the households are defined in terms of their usage profile observed
during October 1999-September 2000. Appendix Table 2.4.1 shows the summary statistics
of household characteristics.
Appendix Table 2.4.1: Usage and Parcel Characteristics, Different Reference Year
All Historical Usage Profile
Households Low & Flat Moderate Heavy & Seasonal
House size (sq. ft.) 2346.29 1950.14 2427.12 2879.72
(878.20) (768.36) (797.71) (947.13)
Number of bedrooms 3.56 3.25 3.63 3.94
(0.96) (0.91) (0.93) (0.97)
Number of bathrooms 2.55 2.22 2.62 2.97
(0.85) (0.82) (0.77) (0.91)
Yard size (acres) 0.44 0.39 0.45 0.50
(0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35)
Property value (1000 USD) 206.65 165.66 214.04 264.59
(98.18) (80.87) (89.75) (115.57)
Total households (N) 4455 1507 2181 767
High wealth households (N) 2375 503 1295 577
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Appendix Table 2.4.2 shows the results of estimating (2.1) using the usage profiles observed
during October 1999-September 2000. We find that the main estimation results are robust to
which pre-treatment year is used to assign usage profiles.




High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0727 -0.0343 -0.0818 -0.0885 -0.1111 -0.0726
(0.0227) (0.015) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0219) (0.0348)
Stage 1 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0017
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0026 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.003
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Emergency -0.0097 -0.0092 -0.0105 -0.0085 -0.0177 -0.0105
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Water stress 0.0630 0.0352 0.0602 0.0449 0.0874 0.0503
(0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0049)
Temperature 0.0312 0.0121 0.0382 0.0206 0.121 0.0372
(0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.0043) (0.0067)
Year trend 0.00530 0.00550 -0.0302 -0.04 -0.0562 -0.0936
(0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0061)
Cons. req. -0.1004 -0.022 -0.15 -0.102 -0.3092 -0.3321
(0.0253) (0.018) (0.0157) (0.019) (0.0234) (0.0411)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.00630 -0.0137 0.0200 0.0151 0.0475 0.0674
(0.0057) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0093)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix Table 2.4.3 shows the year-to-year transitions starting with October 1999-September
2000. The percentages are similar to those presented in Table 2.4.3.
Appendix Table 2.4.3: Transition in Usage Profiles, Different Reference Year
Panel A All Households (N=4455)
Oct99-Sep00 Light (N=1508) Moderate (N=2181) Heavy (N=766)
L M H L M H L M H
Oct00-Sep01 0.81 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.82 0.07 0.01 0.31 0.68
Oct01-Sep02 0.77 0.22 0.01 0.15 0.74 0.11 0.02 0.31 0.68
Oct02-Sep03 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.35 0.62 0.03 0.09 0.57 0.33
Oct03-Sep04 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.32 0.62 0.06 0.06 0.52 0.42
Oct04-Sep05 0.83 0.16 0.01 0.32 0.63 0.05 0.08 0.51 0.42
Panel B Lower Wealth Households (N=2080)
Oct99-Sep00 Light (N=1005) Moderate (N=886) Heavy (N=189)
Oct00-Sep01 0.86 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.80 0.05 0.03 0.37 0.60
Oct01-Sep02 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.19 0.73 0.08 0.03 0.42 0.55
Oct02-Sep03 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.39 0.59 0.02 0.13 0.58 0.29
Oct03-Sep04 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.59 0.05 0.09 0.57 0.34
Oct04-Sep05 0.87 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.60 0.03 0.15 0.57 0.28
Panel C Higher Wealth Households (N=2375)
Oct99-Sep00 Light (N=503) Moderate (N=1295) Heavy (N=577)
Oct00-Sep01 0.70 0.30 0.00 0.09 0.83 0.08 0.01 0.29 0.71
Oct01-Sep02 0.65 0.33 0.02 0.13 0.74 0.13 0.01 0.27 0.72
Oct02-Sep03 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.32 0.64 0.04 0.08 0.57 0.35
Oct03-Sep04 0.80 0.19 0.01 0.29 0.65 0.06 0.05 0.50 0.45
Oct04-Sep05 0.76 0.23 0.01 0.29 0.65 0.06 0.05 0.49 0.46
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Appendix 2.5 Water Stress vs. Traditional Environmental Con-
trols
In this section, we assess the goodness of fit for models using different sets of environmental
controls. We compare the main set of results, using a Block Group-level water stress index,
to models using collections of weather variables. We obtained data for weather variables from
the NC Climate Office for the Chapel Hill-Williams Airport weather station. We use the
following environmental controls:
• Ad hoc collection 1: Total precipitation and average temperature
• Ad hoc collection 2: Total precipitation, lagged total precipitation, average temperature,
lagged average temperature
• Ad hoc collection 3: Total precipitation, total precipitation squared, number of days
with no rain, average temperature
• Water Stress at watershed level and average temperature
• Water Stress at Census Block Group level and average temperature
We do not include NDVI in our comparison models, as the area of study is not well
suited for use because the coarse resolution of the satellite images (30m x 30m) is not precise
enough to discern landscapes on individual parcels in the study area. Aside from typically
small parcel sizes, tree cover is prevalent, and the area is relatively wet, therefore cloud cover
obstruction frequently results in unusable images.33
33NDVI particular useful in areas such as the western United States, regions where parcel sizes
are relatively large, climate is arid and hence experience few cloudy days, and tree cover sparse.
https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/
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We assess model fit based on deviations in prediction accuracy using several model
evaluation scores. We provide scores for root mean squared error (RMSE), mean absolute
percentage error (MAPE), and mean absolute error (MAE) in Appendix Table 2.5.1. The
errors provided in the table are based on differences between actual and predicted values and
smaller errors reflect more accurate predictions. Scores differ in how large errors are treated.
RMSE gives extra weight to large errors whereas MAPE and MAE give equal weight to all
errors. MAPE differs from the other two metrics in that is scores are in terms of percentages
and are therefore scale-independent. The results suggest that using water stress leads to
minor improvements in model fit.
Appendix Table 2.5.1: Goodness of Fit Results
Environmental Model RMSE MAPE MAE
Collection 1 39.452 27.641 28.702
Collection 2 39.322 26.205 28.584
Collection 3 39.145 28.265 28.492
Water Stress Regional 38.723 23.241 28.175
Water Stress Block Group 38.778 25.349 28.204
Notes: All models include average temperature. RMSE: Root mean square error, MAPE: Mean
absolute percentage error, MAE: Mean absolute error
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Estimation Results for Alternative Environmental Controls
Appendix Table 2.5.2 through Appendix Table 2.5.5 contain results from models with
alternative environmental controls. The results are qualitatively similar to the main estimation
results, with a few small differences. Specifically, the alternative environmental controls
produce lower price sensitivity among wealthier households with Moderate and Light usage
profiles, although the differences are smaller in the models with more complex collections of
weather variables. Our findings suggest that collections of weather variables in relatively wet
climate areas similar to the area of study may be used in water demand estimation studies
without the introduction of too much measurement error. Future research, however, is needed
to test the robustness of this measure in the context of different climates.
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The most common combination of weather variables used as environmental controls
is ad hoc collection 1. Using these measures results in price elasticity estimates that are
qualitatively similar though smaller in magnitude to those found when using water stress.





High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0269 -0.0279 -0.0286 -0.033 -0.0295 -0.1018
(0.0236) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0159) (0.0231) (0.0372)
Stage 1 -0.0011 -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0044 -0.0066 -0.0071
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0057 -0.0067 -0.0066
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Emergency -0.0068 -0.0074 -0.013 -0.0113 -0.0221 -0.0128
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Precipitation -0.031 -0.0209 -0.04 -0.0255 -0.0496 -0.0291
(0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0044)
Temperature 0.0235 0.0149 0.0592 0.0294 0.138 0.0506
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.003) (0.0045) (0.0072)
Year trend -0.0283 -0.0076 -0.0121 -0.0143 0.00330 -0.001
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0062)
Cons. req. -0.184 -0.0668 -0.222 -0.1833 -0.2987 -0.1338
(0.0259) (0.018) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0249) (0.0437)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0383 0.00210 0.0172 0.00760 -0.002 -0.0301
(0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0099)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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When we include ad hoc collection 2 in the model, our price elasticity become more similar
to those we obtain when using water stress.





High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0335 -0.0327 -0.0452 -0.0412 -0.0592 -0.108
(0.0238) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.016) (0.0232) (0.0374)
Stage 1 -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0062
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0052 -0.0067 -0.006
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Emergency -0.007 -0.0075 -0.0134 -0.0118 -0.0226 -0.0133
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Precipitation -0.0307 -0.0219 -0.0406 -0.0259 -0.0519 -0.0283
(0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0045)
Lagged precipitation -0.0104 -0.0039 -0.0203 -0.0176 -0.029 -0.0195
(0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0038)
Temperature 0.0178 0.00150 0.0480 0.0250 0.117 0.0516
(0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0106)
Lagged temperature 0.0134 0.0228 0.0280 0.0134 0.0499 0.00460
(0.0081) (0.0054) (0.0048) (0.0057) (0.0079) (0.0134)
Year trend -0.0334 -0.011 -0.0211 -0.0224 -0.0093 -0.0095
(0.0037) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0064)
Cons. req. -0.1883 -0.0711 -0.2293 -0.1884 -0.3091 -0.1395
(0.0259) (0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0249) (0.0436)
Cons. req. X Year trend 0.0424 0.00520 0.0244 0.0137 0.00810 -0.0238
(0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0057) (0.01)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Similarly, when we include ad hoc collection 3 in the model, our price elasticity estimates
become more similar to those we obtain when using water stress.





High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0334 -0.0304 -0.043 -0.0428 -0.0468 -0.1116
(0.0237) (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.016) (0.0231) (0.0373)
Stage 1 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0035 -0.0042 -0.0065 -0.007
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0017 -0.003 -0.0036 -0.0046 -0.005 -0.0055
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Emergency -0.0069 -0.0075 -0.0128 -0.0113 -0.0216 -0.0126
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Precipitation -0.0574 -0.0436 -0.0566 -0.0346 -0.0545 -0.0304
(0.0059) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.004) (0.0058) (0.0094)
Precipitation squared 0.0394 0.0265 0.0333 0.0165 0.0225 0.0107
(0.0062) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0092)
Days no rain 0.00870 -0.0016 0.0253 0.0161 0.0357 0.0213
(0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.002) (0.0026) (0.0043)
Temperature 0.0232 0.0144 0.0612 0.0320 0.141 0.0540
(0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0073)
Year trend -0.028 -0.0089 -0.0103 -0.0137 0.00550 -0.0001
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0062)
Cons. req. -0.1594 -0.0551 -0.1757 -0.1505 -0.2422 -0.0991
(0.0262) (0.0182) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0252) (0.0442)
Cons. req. X Year trend 0.0348 0.00120 0.00990 0.00260 -0.0108 -0.0354
(0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0057) (0.01)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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We obtain similar price elasticity estimates when we use watershed-level water stress measures
versus the Block-Group-level water stress measures of our main analysis.





High Low High Low High Low
Price -0.0655 -0.0467 -0.0869 -0.0691 -0.1095 -0.1367
(0.0238) (0.0149) (0.0138) (0.016) (0.0232) (0.0374)
Stage 1 0.000700 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0033 -0.0051
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Stage 2 -0.0005 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0044
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Emergency -0.0057 -0.007 -0.0113 -0.0104 -0.0197 -0.0117
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Water stress regional 0.0473 0.0317 0.0660 0.0472 0.0857 0.0492
(0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.005)
Temperature 0.0117 0.00800 0.0436 0.0202 0.118 0.0403
(0.0045) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.003) (0.0045) (0.0072)
Year trend -0.0445 -0.0191 -0.0345 -0.0319 -0.0256 -0.0189
(0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0065)
Cons. req. -0.1257 -0.0262 -0.1373 -0.1187 -0.1857 -0.0703
(0.0262) (0.0182) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0252) (0.0442)
Cons. req. x Year trend 0.0416 0.00430 0.0211 0.0106 0.00240 -0.0266
(0.0058) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0099)
Note: Cons. req. is the year conservation requirement OWASA passed following the 2002 drought.
Regressors not shown: read days, and intra-year time trend. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix 2.6 Transitions in Usage Profiles By Wealth
In this section we provide information on the fraction of households that transition in
usage profiles by household wealth. Transitions are qualitatively similar to that observed for
the entire sample with the exception that significant decreases in usage in transitioning from
Heavy to Light are more frequently observed among low wealth households than high wealth
households.
Appendix Table 2.6.1: Transitions in Usage Profiles
Panel A All Households (N=4455)
Oct00-Sep01 Light (N=1481) Moderate (N=2301) Heavy (N=673)
L M H L M H L M H
Oct01-Sep02 0.82 0.17 0.00 0.12 0.76 0.11 0.01 0.24 0.75
Oct02-Sep03 0.89 0.11 0.00 0.35 0.62 0.03 0.05 0.56 0.39
Oct03-Sep04 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.31 0.63 0.06 0.04 0.49 0.46
Oct04-Sep05 0.85 0.14 0.01 0.31 0.64 0.06 0.06 0.49 0.44
Panel B Lower Wealth Households (N=2080)
Oct00-Sep01 Light (N=1003) Moderate (N=912) Heavy (N=165)
Oct01-Sep02 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.77 0.07 0.02 0.35 0.63
Oct02-Sep03 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.40 0.57 0.02 0.06 0.60 0.34
Oct03-Sep04 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.59 0.05 0.04 0.56 0.39
Oct04-Sep05 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.36 0.61 0.03 0.10 0.57 0.33
Panel C Higher Wealth Households (N=2375)
Oct00-Sep01 Light (N=478) Moderate (N=1389) Heavy (N=508)
Oct01-Sep02 0.74 0.26 0.01 0.10 0.76 0.14 0.00 0.20 0.79
Oct02-Sep03 0.87 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.65 0.03 0.05 0.55 0.40
Oct03-Sep04 0.82 0.17 0.01 0.28 0.65 0.07 0.05 0.47 0.48
Oct04-Sep05 0.79 0.19 0.01 0.27 0.65 0.07 0.05 0.47 0.48
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